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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate quantitatively the impact
of alternative pricing policies, aimed at reducing the deficits in the Grain
(mainly rice and barley) Management Fund (GMF), and the Fertilizer Fund (FF)
in Korea. In comparing these alternatives, we measure their impact on
(i) production and consumption of rice and barley, (ii) real income distribution,
including the income distribution in both and rural and the urban sectors,
(iii) import levels of rice, (iv) self-sufficiency in rice and (v) the public
budget. The standard operational methods for evaluating agricultural pricing
policies, namely domestic resource cost (DRC) and effective protection rate
(EPR) calculations and consumer-producer surplus calculations are insufficient
for adequately answering all the questions posed above. Therefore, we have
developed an operational methodology.
Our methodology can be viewed as extending the consumer-producer
surplus method to include income distribution and some general equilibrium
considerations at the cost of further complexity but stopping far short of
a full detailed general equilibrium analysis. Instead we devised a two
sector (rural and urban) multi-market model, which endogenously generates
incomes (rents and wages) in the rural sector, while the incomes of urban
residents are exogenously given. This approach may be viewed as a synthesis
of the work on agricultural households models and the new public economics
literature.
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ABSTRAIT
Ce document evalue l'impact de diverses mesures de fixation des prix
visant a reduire les deficits du Fonds de gestion des cereales (surtout du riz
et de l'orge) et du Fonds des engrais en Coree. En les comparant, on peut
mesurer leur effet sur i) la production et la consommation de riz et d'orge,
ii) la repartition du revenu reel, y compris la repartition du revenu des sec-
teurs rural et urbain, iii) les importations de riz, iv) l'autoapprovisionnement
en riz et v) les finances publiques. Comme les m6thodes normalement utilis6es
pour 6valuer ces mesures (calcul du couit reel des ressources interieures et du
taux de protection effective et comptes de surplus du consommateur et du produc-
teur) ne permettent pas d'apporter de reponse satisfaisante sur tous ces points,
nous avons elabore une nouvelle approche.
On peut la consid6rer comme une extension de la methode des comptes de
surplus du consommateur et du producteur qui englobe la repartition du revenu et
quelques notions d'equilibre general; elle est donc un peu plus complexe que les
methodes traditionnelles, mais elle ne va pas jusqu'a une analyse complete et
d6taill6e de l'6quilibre general. Nous avons cree un modele bisectoriel (rural
et urbain) a plusieurs marches ou les revenus (loyers et salaires) degages par
le secteur rural sont traites de facon endogene alors que les revenus des resi-
dents des villes sont donn6s d'une maniere exogene. On peut voir dans cette
approche une synthese des travaux sur les modeles des menages agricoles et des
dernieres publications sur l'economie du secteur public.
EXTRACTO
La finalidad de este documento es evaluar cuantitativamente el efecto
de diferentes politicas de precios que tienen por objeto reducir los d6ficit del
Fondo de Administraci6n de Cereales (principalmente arroz y cebada) y del Fondo
de Fertilizantes de Corea. Al comparar estas opciones, medimos su efecto en:
i) la producci6n y el consumo de arroz y cebada; ii) la distribuci6n de ingresos
reales, que incluye la distribuci6n de ingresos en los sectores tanto rural como
urbano; iii) los niveles de importaci6n de arroz; iv) la autosuficiencia en
arroz, y v) el presupuesto fiscal. Los m6todos operacionales corrientes para
evaluar las politicas de precios de productos agricolas, a saber, los cilculos
del costo de los recursos internos y de la tasa de protecci6n efectiva y las
c&lculos de los excedentes de consumidores y productores son insuficientes para
satisfacer en forma adecuada todos los interrogantes planteados anteriormente.
Por consiguiente, hemos elaborado una metodologia operacional.
Puede considerarse que nuestra metodologia amplia el metodo de exce-
dentes de los consumidores y productores de forma de incluir consideraciones
relativas a la distribuci6n de ingresos y otras sobre el equilibrio general a
costa de una mayor complejidad, pero que queda muy lejos de Ilegar a un analisis
pleno y detallado de equilibrio general. En su lugar hemos ideado un modelo de
multimercado con dos sectores (rural y urbano), que en forma end6gena genera
ingresos (salarios e ingresos no salariales) en el sector rural, en tanto que
los ingresos de los residentes urbanos se presentan en forma ex6gena. Este
enfoque puede considerarse como una sintesis del trabajo sobre los modelos de
unidades familiares agricolas y la nueva literatura sobre economia puTblica.
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Chapter I
Introduction
I.1 Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate quantitatively the impact of
alternative pricing policies, aimed at reducing the deficits in the Grain
(mainly rice and barley) Management Fund (GMF), and the Fertilizer Fund (FF)
in Korea. In comparing these alternatives, we measure their impact on (i)
production and consumption of rice and barley, (ii) real income distribution,
including the income distribution in both the rural and the urban sectors,
(iii) import levels of rice, (iv) self-sufficiency in rice and (v) the public
budget. The standard operational methods for evaluating agricultural pricing
policies, namely domestic resource cost (DRC) and effective protection rate
(EPR) calculations 1/ and consumer-producer surplus calculations 2/ are
insufficient for adequately answering all the questions posed above.
Therefore, we have developed an operational methodology. I/ In this chapter
we shall briefly discuss the following: (a) the basic methodology, (b) the
Korean problem, and the ways the basic model has been modified to handle the
particular institutional details of Korea, (c) the data sources and the
methods of estimation, and (d) the different policy scenarios analyzed.
1/ For example see P. Scandizzo and C. Bruce [1980].
2/ For demonstration of the application of this tool to the same problem of
Korea's rice price policy, see Tolley-Thomas-Wong [1982], and Anderson
[19811.
3/ For a similar approach concerning the agricultural sector a-lone and applied to
Taiwan, China, see Lau, Yotopolous, Chou and Lin (1981]. For theoretical
discussion of the Town vs. Country debate which underlies some of the main
issues of this report see Brayerman-Sah-Stiglitz [19821.
-2-
[.2 Methodology
In evaluating the impact of changes in different taxes and subsidies we
must remember the main reasons for the imposition of these taxes and subsidies
in the first place. These are: (i) redistribution of income, (ii) generation
of public revenues for public expenditures, (iii) correcting market failures
and (iv) providing production incentives. In many LDC's, where the
administrative infrastructure for income tax is still in its infant stages,
commodity taxation is often the only feasible tax instrument. Taxation and
subsidization of agricultural products and in particular, taxation and
subsidization of main food items, is clearly one of the major issues of
political economy in LDC's (and in developed countries as well). Hence, any
operational tool aimed at providing a quantitative framework for the political
economy discussion concerning alternative agricultural pricing policies must
address these issues.
The two standard operational tools for evaluation of alternative
agricultural pricing policies are not fully equipped to do so. The first
method, which measures the domestic resource cost (DRC) and effective
protection rate (EPR) of different taxes and subsidies, neither addresses the
income distribution and public revenue issues, nor can it address the
quantitative impact of these taxes and subsidies on production and
consumption. The second method, calculation of consumers' and producers'
surplus in its operational version, does not devote sufficient attention to
income distribution beyond the classification of agents into consumers and
producers, and is mostly used for addressing the impact of a single tax
change. Where the impact of simultaneous changes of several taxes in a
"normal," i.e. "distorted," economy have to be measured, one must consider the
interrelation of different markets directly through substitution
- 3 -
possiblilities in production and consumption and indirectly through the impact
on the labor market.
Our methodology can be viewed as extending the surplus method to include
income distribution and some general equilibrium considerations at the cost of
further complexity but stopping far short of a full detailed general
equilibrium analysis. Instead we devised a "limited" two sector (rural and
urban) multi-market model, which endogenously generates incomes (rents and
wages) in the rural sector, while the incomes of urban residents are
exogenously given. This approach may be viewed as a synthesis of the work on
agricultural households models 4/ and the new public economics
literature. 5/ It uses simple models of farm-household behavior as its basic
building blocks. These models allow a microeconomic investigation of both
producer and consumer response to exogeneous price changes within an
integrated consumer-cum-producer framework. Variations in rural incomes are
due to different sizes of holdings and different labor endowments. Through
aggregation over households, aggregate supply and demand functions including
those of labor are generated. Hence, we can evaluate the impact of price
changes at the market level. In particular we can derive the marketed surplus
functions, i.e. the net domestic supplies to the urban sector of rice and
barley in the Korean case. In addition we can evaluate the impact of these
price changes on the welfare of the individual household. In the urban
sector, households, which differ in their exogenous incomes, are the micro
entity. Through aggregation over the individual demand functions of urban
See, for example, Barnum and Squire [1979], and Ahn, Singh and Squire
[1981].
See, for example, Atkinson and Stiglitz [1980].
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households, urban market demand functions are generated. The equilibrium
conditions capture the particular institutional details of the market
organization - i.e., perfectly competitive, imperfectly competitive or
monopoly, the particular forms of government intervention and the different
degrees of international trade. Different aggregation rules of real income
changes over the individual households are based on differences in location,
i.e. rural or urban and on differences in income. These rules allow us to
compare different aggregate measures of society's welfare change.
Other important considerations are the data requirements of the model.
As will be elaborated later in the text, and briefly in subsection I.4 below,
the methodology is designed to handle different degrees of data availability.
I.3 The Korean problem
In its past rice price policy the Government of Korea (GOK) tried to
fulfill the following three objectives:
(a) Achieving self-sufficiency in rice production;
(b) Maintaining rural incomes in parity with urban incomes;
(c) Keeping low prices in the cities in order to restrain urban workers'
demand for wages increases.
Objectives (b) and (c) hold for barley too. (Korea is self sufficient in
barley). In addition to these three objectives the GOK aimed at stabilizing
urban consumers prices, especially of rice, during the calendar year and
across years. We shall not deal in this paper with the price stabilization
issue.
In order to fulfill the first three objectives, the GOK generated wedges
between the rural prices and urban prices of rice and barley. These wedges,
which constitute price support to farmers and subsidies to urban consumers,
generated large deficits. The Grain Management Fund (GMF) (the system through
- 5 -
which the rice and barley price policies are executed) deficit was about 0.7
percent of GNP in the late 1970's. 6/ However, the subsidized prices for
urban consumers of both rice and barley are still substantially higher than
world prices.
In addition, fertilizers are produced domestically at guaranteed prices
significantly higher than international prices. This is due mainly to two
reasons: (a) Korea produces Urea out of Naphta rather than from natural gas,
the cheaper source, and (b) the Korean government entered into disadvantageous
joint ventures with foreign companies. By the Joint Venture Decree these
companies are guaranteed both a rate of return on their capital and a volume
of government purchases (all domestic demand is handled through government
channels). These guarantees, the last of which is to expire in 1986, imply
high price support for the fertilizer industry. To partially compensate
farmers for the inefficient production of fertilizers, the government sells
farmers fertilizers through the Fertilizer Fund (FF) at subsidized prices,
i.e. prices lower than factory prices. The FF deficit was approximately 0.2
percent of GNP in 1979. The subsidized prices, though, are still above
international prices. In 1979, they were about 20% higher than international
prices. Hence, these fertilizer subsidies are really a tax on farmers and a
transfer to the fertilizer industry. On the other hand the subsidized prices
6/ The GMF deficit has been financed by direct loans from the Bank of Korea
(BOK) and hence institutionally it was tied directly to increases in the
money supply and inflationary pressures. Clearly, in principle it could
have been financed from the general budget while other items of public
expenditures be financed by direct borrowing from BOK. However, given
that this type of financing was taking place, politically, the GMF (and
similarly the FF) deficits were connected in the debate over the size of
the budget deficit more to money creation than other components of
government expenditures. Recently, however, the Gok has decided to
finance the GMF from the general budget.
-6 -
of rice and barley are really a tax on urban consumers, given lower
international price. For the base year 1979, the rural price of rice was
approximately 65% above the world prices and the urban price was approximately
50% above. For barley, the rural price was more than two and one half times
the world price while the urban price was about 30% above.
The GOK decided to reduce both GMF and FF deficits. Since there are
alternative ways to do so, and since the three commodities in question: rice,
barley and fertilizers are linked through production and consumption to each
other, the task of comparing the quantitative impact of these alternative
policies on the conflicting targets of the GOK can be carried through the
basic methodology outlined above. However, in tailoring the general
methodology to the Korea problem, we had to respond to the particular
institutional details of Korea. (See Appendix A on institutional details and
Chapter II for the Korea Model). The most important considerations to be
introduced here are the existence of two different types of rice, High
Yielding Variety (HYV) and Traditional Variety (TV), and the actual operation
of the GMF.
HYV rice and TV rice are two distinct products. TV is much preferred by
consumers. However, to stimulate production and move towards self sufficiency
in rice the GOK provides price support only for HYV. To encourage urban
consumption of HYV, only HYV is subsidized. Clearly the degrees of
substitution between these two products in production and consumption are
critical in evaluating the impact of government price intervention in the HYV
market alone. However, data is only collected in Korea for the aggregate
commodity called "rice". The way we handled this problem is discussed in
chapter II and Appendix B. Considering the functioning of the two markets, TV
rice market is assumed to be perfectly competitive private market, while the
- 7 -
HYV market is assumed to be totally government controlled. It is true that
for 1979 (the year to which the model is calibrated), the government did not
purchase all the HYV produced. In addition to the government controlled
market there exists a private market for HYV. However, the size of this
market declined significantly in the early 80's with the reduction in total
production of HYV. Therefore, for modelling simplification, we assumed that
all the marketed surplus of HYV is purchased and sold only by the government.
7. (See detailed description of the rice market in Appendix A).
1.4 Data sources and estimation procedures
The model is calibrated and analyzed for 1979 data. The basic tables
underlying the model are provided in Appendix A. The parameter estimates are
available in Appendix C. The estimation is based on farm household surveys
collected in 1970 and 1977 by the Ministry of Agriculture (MAF). The demand
functions are estimated using the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). The main
advantage of this system over the Linear Expenditure system (LES) is that it
allows commodities to be inferior goods. Where disaggregated basic food items
such as barley and HYV are considered, this is essential. AIDS has another
merit. If data is scarce it can be collapsed into the Cobb-Douglas form which
requires information only on budget shares. This is to be expected in data
scarce countries such as many African countries. For production estimation we
use the Translog profit function which also can be collapsed into a Cobb-
Douglas form. In the Korean case, the simulation results using Cobb-Douglas
and Translog forms were very similar. Therefore, for analytical simplicity we
-/ However, it seems that for 1983 the government is considering again
significant quantity control of the HYV market. In principle, our basic
methodology can be extended to include this feature.
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used the Cobb-Douglas form. Detailed discussion of all these issues is
provided in the main text and in Appendices B and C.
I.5 Policy Scenarios
We model a variety of scenarios under two different assumptions
concerning the rural labor market; (i) Assuming fixed wage i.e. perfectly
elastic supply of labor, the Lewis assumption and (ii) perfectly inelastic
supply of labor, which follows from the AIDS demand specification, when
leisure is assumed separable from other commodities and migration is not
allowed. The appropriate quantitative results lie between these two bounds.
The policy scenarios include:
(a) Single price changes
10% (20%) decrease in the rural price of rice (barley)
10% (20%) increase in the urban price of rice (barley)
20% increase in farmers' fertilizer price.
Raising farmers' fertilizer price to factory-gate price.
Lowering farmers' fertilizer price to international price.
(b) Multiple price changes
The simultaneous price changes considered here are aimed at
eliminating the operational deficit of the GMF under alternative assumptions
regarding farmers' fertilizer price. The policies examined are:
(i) decreasing rice and barley rural prices, excluding handling cost, to
current urban price levels;
(ii) increasing barley and rice urban prices to the current level of rural
prices.
(iii) allowing the two commodities to move in different directions, i.e.
moving urban rice price towards the rural price while moving rural barley
price towards its current urban level, and vice-versa.
- 9 -
(iv) Closed economy laissez faire.
(v) Free trade. None of the scenarios examined allow for rationing or
quantitative controls to be used in government policy. The exact descriptions
of all the different scenarios are provided in Chapter 3.
- 10 -
Chapter II
Model Description and Policy Scenarios
II.1 Introduction
The following model is designed to trace the impact of major policy
changes on a variety of indicators of national welfare and economic
activity. The formal structure of the model is reserved for Appendix B. This
section presents an overview of its construction and operation.
The principal policy changes to be examined are all geared to the
reduction of the deficit in the combined operations of the Grain Management
Fund and the Fertilizer Fund. While there are many ways to reduce government
expenditures on the agricultural subsidy programs, their impact on the
economic well-being of the country and of particular sectors of the economy
differ widely. The model is used to sort out these differential effects. The
main alternatives are to raise the urban consumer prices, lower purchase
prices received by farmers, increase farmers' fertilizer price and to try
different degrees of free market policies including or excluding international
trade in agricultural commodities.
Indicators of economic performance and welfare should react quite
differently to these alternatives. The indicators of concern will be
government deficits themselves (expected to be reduced in all versions), real
incomes of various classes of rural producers-cum-consumers and urban
consumers, and total production, consumption and imports of these
commodities. Since a stated goal of the government is self-sufficiency, the
last indicator is of great importance. From the effects on different income
groups, aggregate values for "weighted" national income can be computed
reflecting values the government may place on the various groups. In this
- 11 -
way, particular concern for the poor or for the rural sector vis a vis the
urban sector may be incorporated.
The basic structure of the model is straightforward. The model
explicitly considers the supply and demand for three consumer goods: High
yield rice which is marketed and subsidized by the government, barley which is
also subsidized and passes through government channels and traditional rice
which is traded on private markets. Also included explicitly are the supply
and demand of two factors of production: Chemical fertilizer which is
government controlled and labor. Institutional detail is incorporated through
the specification of market clearing conditions. The basic outcomes of the
model are determined, however, by supply and consumption responses to the
price changes engendered by the policy experiments.
These supply responses are themselves derived from underlying production
functions for agricultural products faced by farm households. The consumption
responses come from utility functions which characterize preferences for
consumer goods in both farm and urban households. The use of production and
utility functions was preferred to the direct use of supply and demand
elasticities for a variety of reasons, even at the expense of simplicity and
computational convenience. Following in the tradition of the farm household
model incorporating production and consumption decisions (e.g. Barnum and
Squire [1979]; Ahn, Singh and Squire [1981]; Yotopolous and Lau [1974],)
features of the production structure are thought to influence the consumption
behavior of the household. Profits from farm production yield income which
influences food demand and marketed surplus. Information on supply response
alone cannot be used to generate this income gain. In addition, factor demand
is an essential feature of the current model. Fertilizer is directly marketed
by the government and is a major element in the deficit. Labor time
- 12 -
valuation, and hence imputed income, determine much of "full" income. (On
this concept see subsection II.3 below.) A full production structure is
necessary to ensure consistency of the factor demands and output responses.
Supply, then, is derived under the assumption of profit maximization subject
to the production technology.
On the consumption side, demand curves are linked to utility functions in
order to assess the welfare implications of consumer price changes involving a
number of goods simultaneously. Since three commodities and labor supply all
enter the model explicitly, it is important to have a framework in which all
are consistently related. A second reason for relying on the utility function
characterization of demand is to be able to use the concept of the
compensating variation as a device for welfare comparisons. This allows us to
incorporate insights and results from recent work in the public finance
literature (e.g. Atkinson/Stiglitz [1980]).
The remainder of this chapter will examine the model in detail, beginning
with the underlying production and demand structure and working up to the
market clearing conditions.
II.2 Agricultural Production
The production structure assumed for all commodities is characterized by
the translog restricted profit function (Lau [1976]). This is a flexible
functional form in the sense that it can accommodate a large variety of
substitution possibilities and factor demand elasticities. Inputs to
production are classified into fixed and variable. Rents accruing to the
fixed factor (land) are considered part of family income. The variable inputs
to production are fertilizer, labor and other inputs. Since the farm is
assumed to be competitive in factor markets, the family endowment of labor
does not affect use and allocation of labor in production. If family labor is
- 13 -
too small to meet demand at current factor prices, the farm will hire in
workers from outside. If the family is too large relative to demand, in the
sense that the marginal product of family labor would be lower than market
wage if it were used completely on the farm, then the family is assumed to
hire members out. Therefore, profits on the farm are dependent on the prices
of the variable factors and the quantities of the fixed factor. The profit
function yields (as is discussed in Appendix B) the supply of the product, the
demand for the factors of production, and directly, the net return to the farm
from land ownership. These are all functions of the commodity and input
prices.
While land is fixed to the farm, it is not necessarily fixed between
uses. In particular, paddy land can be used in production of either high
yield or traditional variety rice. The decision of how much land to allocate
to each use is assumed to be governed by profit maximization principles as
well. The equilibrium condition for land allocation is that the marginal
revenue product of land in each use are equated. If this were not the case,
transfers of land from the lower productivity use to the higher would always
increase profits. When the model is in operation, a change in the
administered price of high yield variety rice will induce a reallocation of
land toward high yield varieties which will increase total profits but not
without some cost in foregone earnings from traditional variety rice. The
inclusion of substitution possibilities increases the realism of the model as
far as the total effect on rice output and on rural income generation are
concerned. Since barley is grown in a completely different season from rice,
though usually on the same land, no explicit substitution is considered
between these commodities. Indeed, the usual alternative to barley production
is to leave the land to lie fallow, and there is no need to incorporate the
- 14 -
opportunity cost of barley into family income which is not already handled by
labor time and factor costs. (There is a relatively subtle form of
intertemporal substitution between barley and rice via the depletion of
nutrients in the soil from barley production. This is, however, a bit too
subtle for present concerns.)
II.3 Rural Incomes and Commodity Demand
Incomes in the rural areas are derived from three sources. The first is
profit from barley and rice production as described above. The second is wage
income or, as will be discussed below, the full value of the time of household
members evaluated at the wage rate. The third is income from profits from
non-agricultural pursuits. For the purposes of the simulation, the rural
sector was divided into four groups, corresponding to the presentation of the
large majority of the data from Korean sources. The division into classes was
solely on the basis of the amount of land owned, taken from the Farm Household
Economy Survey. The classes are: a) those owning less than .5 hectares
(33.6% of the rural sector b) those owning between .5 and 1 hectare (34.3%),
c) those owning between 1 and 1.5 hectares (18.2%) and d) those owning more
than 1.5 hectares (13.9%).
Wages for farm workers are assumed equal across the classes. Data on
rice and barley land owned by these classes as well as information on off-farm
or non-agricultural earnings are also available from the Farm Household and
Production Cost surveys.
Two versions of the model are used in this exercise corresponding to the
definitions of income. The first and the most straightforward version uses
disposable income which is broken into two components, profits from the rice
and barley production and from other sources. In the simulation exercise only
- 15 -
profits will be affected by policy intervention, the other component being
held fixed.
The second version uses the concept of "full" income associated
with Gary Becker [1965]. In this case, the value of leisure time is
incorporated into the model and "income" includes the value of the family's
total time endowment. On the assumption that people choose the number of
hours which they work, the opportunity cost of an hour of leisure is the
amount earned by an hour of working, i.e. the wage. Full income, then,
includes the entire time available to potential workers (e.g. 24 hours/day)
evaluated at the wage rate plus profits and other non-labor income. The
purpose of introducing this concept is to be able to derive "demand" functions
for leisure and hence supply functions for labor. If the impact of price
support policies on the agricultural wage is ignored, the appraisal of the
welfare consequences of the policy options can be severely biased. Inclusion
of a complete demand system which accomodates labor supply decision can shed
considerable light on both the distributional effects of pricing policies and
the effects on production.
The valuation of leisure raises the issue of comparability of urban and
rural incomes and welfare. Popular wisdom on the subject would indicate that
urban workers spend more time on the job than do their rural counterparts. If
so, the value of the latter's leisure should be included in welfare
comparison. Due to seasonality in the demand for labor in the rural sector,
however, the valuation of this "leisure" time is problematic. For the sake of
comprehensibility, the results reported will be in terms of disposable income
derived from the implicit hours worked in the model.
The actual demand system to be used in the model is a flexible functional
form akin to that used in the production side of the model. It was orginally
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devised by Deaton and Muellbauer [1980] and dubbed the Almost Ideal Demand
System (AIDS) (a somewhat unfortunate abbreviation these daysl). Certain
features of this model make it attractive in the current context. First of
all, as in the translog production structure discussed above, this functional
form can allow a greater variety of price elasticities to be determined by
estimation or by a priori information than most other common demand systems.
More important for the Korea case, however, is its flexibility with regard to
income elasticities. Barley is generally considered to be an inferior good.
8/ Judging from summary reports of consumer expenditure surveys, the
consumption of high yield variety'rice tends to increase with income at low
levels of income but to reach a peak and thereafter decrease with income.
This inverse U shaped Engel curve is commonly encountered with foodstuffs at
such a disaggregated level. The demand system chosen can accommodate that
pattern rather than forcing the income elasticities to be positive
everywhere. The implications of positive versus negative income elasticities
are substantial in the Korean context since they will have very different
consequences concerning the elasticity of marketed surplus and, hence, of the
cost of government programs as farm prices are manipulated.
II.4 Urban Incomes and Demand
The urban sector is divided into four income groups of approximately the
8/ The estimation of the demand curve for barley potentially posed a number
of problems. Throughout most of the 1970's, the government imposed
requirements that barley was to be mixed with rice in all public places. This
would artificially increase the demand for barley and link that demand to rice
consumption, especially in the urban areas. The estimation of total demand
would then be quite complicated and difficult to extract from survey data.
Fortunately, it was possible to ignore this effect in the current context.
Estimation of individual demand was based on a 1970 sample survey which took
place before the regulations were put into effect. The model is calibrated to
fit 1979 aggregate figures, a date which is after these regulations had
already been removed.
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same size. Much less concern is given to the specification of income
generation in the urban areas. In contrast to the rural sector, the source of
the inequality in the urban income distribution is assumed to be only
differences in the wages of the four classes. In 1979 the classes chosen
were: a) disposable incomes less than 150,000 won/month (21.4%) b) incomes
between 150,000 won and 210,000 won (24.3%) c) incomes between 210,000 won and
300,000 won (24.3%) and d) incomes over 300,000 won (30%). Since the wage
structure and urban incomes are assumed to be fixed throughout most of the
analysis, the specific cause for such differences is not of crucial
importance.
Urban real incomes are dependent on the prices of consumer goods. A
variety of price indices were examined. The one reported is the Stone index,
specific to income group, which is a close approximation to compensating
variations implicit in the AIDS framework. The AIDS demand system is assumed
to behave the same in both the urban and rural areas, i.e. price elasticities
of the sector average incomes are constrained to be the same.
II.5 Market Clearing
With the building blocks of the production and consumption decision rules
in place, market clearing conditions are constructed to incorporate
institutional details of the Korean economy.
The crucial relationships in the Korean context relates to the rice
market. The market outcome for both types of rice and the land allocated
between them are simultaneously determined. For high yield variety rice, the
equilibrium condition for clearing is that total supply equal total demand.
The former is composed of current production and total imports of rice from
abroad. Current production is determined by the policy variables of the
support prices of high yield rice and of fertilizer, both determined by
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government choice. Imports are also completely controlled by the government,
international trade being in official hands. While much of the rice imported
by the government is actually of the traditional type and not the high yield
variety, it is included in the market of the latter. This is due to the fact
that the imports are of lower quality than usual traditional type rice and are
marketed with rice going through government channels.
The demand side of the market is composed of three parts. Rural demand
is determined by rural incomes and prices faced by farmers in the
countryside. Both of these components are strongly influenced by government
activity, high yield prices being a significant factor in rural incomes.
Urban demand is determined by the sales price of high yield rice and all other
consumer prices. The third major component of demand is a slack variable of
sorts and represents rice lost to waste, vermin or to animal feed. It is
calculated for the base year as a means of removing discrepancies between
supply and demand but is a constant proportion of supply throughout the
remaining analysis.
Two caveats should be mentioned here. First it is assumed that all high
yield rice passes through government hands. This implies both that the
government will buy all high yield rice at posted prices and that the price
wedge generated by policy is not circumvented by arbitrage or black market
operations by private citizens. While the first assumption has not held for
some years in the recent past, the government has had an increasing share of
the high yield market over the past few years and by now does control
virtually the entire crop.9 / The second assumption can be justified on the
basis of the relatively strict adherence to the law in Korean society. While
9
-I/ However, this may change in 1983. See footnote 7 above.
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not a plausible assumption in many places in the world, the chance that the
marketing laws are respected in Korea is high.
The second observation about the high yield market as described is that,
as stated, the market may be "overdetermined" in the sense that enough
variables are controlled by government that supplies may not necessarily equal
demand. For instance, demand and supply may be determined to a large extent
by government prices. If imports and inventories are also set arbitrarily by
the government, then nothing assures material balances. This can be handled
by alternative assumptions concerning how the government would react to
discrepancies. The first method is to assume that imports will be used to
fill in any gaps between urban demand and available rice. This simply removes
one policy parameter from government control. Alternatively we can
reinterpret the variable "imports" to be the sum of imports and inventory
accumulated. Imports can then be determined by fiat but the consequences of
market clearing would then be to induce unanticipated depletion or
accumulation of stocks.
The traditional rice market is assumed to be in a private, closed economy
equilibrium with the marketed surplus equalling urban demand (the surplus
being net of animal feed and waste). The two markets are intimately linked
through the land allocation decisions by farmers. The price of traditional,
free market rice is ultimately influenced by government pricing policy. The
line of causality would be that an increase in the producer price of high
yield rice via policy, will increase the profitability of land in high yield
cultivation. This induces farmers to shift out of traditional rice
production, reducing its supply. The supply reduction will increase consumer
prices. Thus the "free market" price of rice will follow the controlled price
to a greater or lesser extent depending on the substitutability between the
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grains in production. Ignoring the effect of this substitution would lead to
underestimates of the impact of government activity on rural incomes and
consumer prices. Conversely, ignoring differences between the rice varieties
by aggregating rice into a single homogenous commodity would tend to
overestimate the impact of government policy on incomes, prices and, of
course, the deficit due to the rice sales.
The barley market, like high yield rice, is assumed to be completely in
government hands. The purchase price of the government is the rural producer
and consumer price, release price is the urban consumption price. Supply is
entirely domestic as imports have never been significant. Market clearing is
brought about by inventory accumulation or reduction if any discrepancy arises
between the marketed surplus (essentially a function of rural prices) and
urban demand. In recent years this discrepancy has been substantial,
resulting in large increases in inventories.
Fertilizer supply is exogenous to the current model. The agreements
between the government and foreign producers are assumed binding. Therefore,
both total available fertilizer and its acquisition price are set from outside
the system. Prices which farmers face are a matter of policy. The production
structure yields the demand for fertilizer in rice and barley. The residual
farm demand for fertilizer in other uses is assumed to be a function of the
price also. Any discrepancies between total demand and contractual agreement
supply is met by exports to world markets (total production has always run
ahead of demand) and changes in inventory.
Four versions of the model can be run, each with a different assumption
concerning the labor market. The results of two of these versions are
presented in this report. A major advantage of detailed modelling of the
rural sector is the ability to incorporate factor market conditions for the
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analysis of output and income determination. The precise institutional
assumption regarding labor market equilibrium are likely to have a substantial
effect on the response of incomes to policy changes, particularly the effect
of food prices on rural incomes.
The four assumptions are: a) the rural wage rate is fixed, b) the rural
wage is endogenous, but the rural population and labor supply is fixed, c) the
rural wage and labor supply are endogenous but the rural population is fixed,
d) all three variables are endogenous.
The first assumption is consistent with the "unlimited supply of labor"
models in development theory dating from the Lewis model. The results derived
from this version will show the smallest impact of pricing policy on rural
incomes: only profitability of crops will be affected by policy while using
this assumption. Family endowments of labor will retain their original
value. The market clears entirely by the demand for labor derived from the
production function.
Fixing the labor supply but allowing the wage to vary to clear the market
will have the strongest impact on rural income and welfare. A reduction of
the purchase price of rice will lead to a decline in demand for labor. With
supply fixed, this translates immediately into lower wages. The assumption of
fixed labor supply is tantamount to assuming that the utility function is of a
Cobb-Douglas type between leisure and goods. This is a special case of the
AIDS System described above.
Only the results of the above two versions will be reported since they
represent the possible extreme assumptions concerning the labor market. The
remaining two versions can be considered for future extensions.
Allowing the supply of labor to vary in accordance to the utility
function to be estimated is a compromise of the two previous cases. With a
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properly estimated demand system, it is probably the case closest to reality
for the short run. The short run here is defined as the time horizon within
which no migration can take place.
The last assumption allows migration to affect the size of the rural
population. The equilibrating factor in this version is the level of utility
in the rural and urban sectors. One characterization of migration equilibrium
is modelled by the equating average utility of the rural dwellers (a function
of rural wages and prices) to that of the urban dwellers (a function of urban
wages and prices). This version of the model is likely to have effects
similar to the fixed wage case on income and prices since the option to
migrate will add extra responsiveness to the labor supply function. It should
point out, however, the intersectoral flows which might be expected from
relaxing the policies which are supposed to benefit the rural sector. 10/
Finally, the deficits in the funds devoted to the government price
policies are calculated in a straightforward manner. For the Grain Management
Fund, the deficit is composed of the differential between purchase and sale
prices plus handling cost times the marketed surplus. In the rice market, the
costs are partly offset by sales of imported grain at higher urban prices.
This is the implicit tariff revenue from importing cheap rice. Barley is not
assumed to be traded except in the one version simulating complete free
trade. The excess of supply over demand is assumed to increase inventories at
cost to the government but with no implicit economic return. This sidesteps
the intertemporal issues involved with inventory carry over and interest
payments. For the Fertilizer Fund, the deficit is the differential of
purchase and sales prices times the volume of sales to domestic consumers plus
10
-4.L For some discussion of current migration issues see Yusut et al. (1983).
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cost of acquiring new inventories. This can be partly offset by some sales
abroad at quite disadvantageous prices.
I1.6 Calibration
The above model is calibrated to match the basic, aggregate facts of the
Korean agricultural sector in 1979. Basic production structure parameters are
determined either by direct estimates or by data available from the Production
Cost Survey done by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries for 1970 and
1977 (in this case, a Cobb-Douglas variant of the production system is
used). Profitability of the crops is determined by using the assumed
production system in conjunction with aggregate figures on output in order to
generate the complete base period production structure. The consequences of
using each of these sources of data are discussed in Chapter IV.
Similarly, demand parameters are used which generate base period
quantities. Two demand systems are generated, one using econometric estimate
from survey data and the other, referred to as the aggregate share version,
uses only aggregate consumption values to calibrate the AIDS system and has
implicitly unitary own price elasticities for the included consumption
goods. Even with the estimated system, enough freedom to match actual
aggregate figures is provided by shift parameters in the demand system which
can be attributed to the effects of prices of other goods not accounted for in
the estimation procedure. Details of the calibration and base period values
appear in the Appendices.
Market clearing terms are known with a fair amount of confidence. Actual
descrepancies between production, consumption and import figures become the
constants representing waste and animal feed. In general, the aggregate
numbers are used in the calibration procedure to put bounds on the estimated
parameters of production and consumption. Once these values are determined,
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however, the system is run in reverse with parameters taken as constant and
the aggregate values of production and consumption allowed to change in
response to policy changes.
II.7 Policy Scenarios - Descriptive Model
The deficits from the Grain Management and Fertilizer Funds have become
very large in recent years. This burden has caused the government to search
for ways to decrease the cost drastically. In order to provide answers most
useful to the government, the model is used to analyze relatively large
changes in the policy variables. All situations which are analyzed lead to
smaller deficits. A principle type of situation for comparison is one in
which deficits are eliminated completely. In addition, it is often useful to
analyze small changes in each policy instrument to assess the sensitivity of
results to individual price changes.
Since the number of possible policy regimes is quite large, they are
presented in a series of tables designed to highlight the results of the main
policy options. In each case, the characteristics of the economy affected by
the policy are the same. These are presented in the form of percentage
changes from the base period run with historical figures. The responses
analyzed are:
1. Changes in the deficits of the rice, barley and fertilizer funds.
2. Total production, consumption and marketed surplus of rice and
barley. Related to this is the self-sufficiency ratio of production
divided by consumption. 1!
/ Readers must be aware that referring only to a self sufficiency ratio may
be very misleading, i.e. a large increase in urban consumer prices may
decrease consumption substantially so as to achieve a 100% self
sufficiency rate. However, the public notion of an increase in self
sufficiency is usually associated with increased production under given
real prices.
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3. Changes in rural incomes, both on average and divided into the four
classes. For some purposes, the fate of the rural sector as a whole is
considered of primary importance. For some purposes, however the
intrasectoral distribution of income is of concern.
4. Changes in urban incomes, as above.
5. Changes in the rural and urban consumer price index. Combined with
the changes in incomes, the price index can be used to calculate real
incomes and reflect the true cost of proposed policy changes.
6. Aggregate welfare measures. The main measures to be used are
"weighted national income" where the real incomes of different groups are
differentially weighted to reflect the importance of such groups to
government decision makers. In one version, the income of the group will
determine the weight, with poor people being counted more heavily than
rich. In another, people in the rural sector may be given extra weight
in the social welfare function reflecting the Korean government's concern
for the status of the rural sector and the tendency to urban migration.
One variant of the income weighted measure is the measure devised by
Atkinson which evaluates the income of people with a particular function
which reflects society's degree of aversion to income inequality.
The first set of results, presented in Table 1, examines the effect of
changing one price at a time, holding all others fixed. These will point out
the basic sensitivities of the economy to each of the policy instruments. For
rice and barley, the policies examined are a) a small (10% or 20%) reduction
in the rural price, b) a small (10% or 20%) increase in the urban price. c)
price reductions in rural areas or increases in urban areas sufficient to
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eliminate the deficit due to the single commodity, d) a move to international
prices.
For fertilizer, the farmers' price is allowed to vary in both
directions. First, a small increase and an increase to the contractual supply
price to decrease the deficit is examined. However, since the contracts with
the foreign companies are likely to be allowed to expire without
renegotiation, price reductions for fertilizer to be examined should include a
small decrease and one to match international prices.
The second major set of results, presented in Table 2, should show the
effects of reducing the deficit in all funds. For fertilizer, this can be
done either at the current procurement price or at world prices in
anticipation of the expiration of the contracts and increased efficiency in
fertilizer production. For the other commodities, a zero deficit will require
the equation of urban and rural prices (after accounting for handling
charges). The following options are examined: a) both rice and barley prices
equal the current urban price, b) both equal the current rural price, c) one
equals the urban, one the rural and vice versa, d) closed economy laissez-
faire (all prices endogenous with zero imports) and e) open economy laissez-
faire (all prices equal world prices).
Of these, the final option represents the greatest tilt toward the urban
sector. Within the context of a closed (or mostly so) economy, option a)
values the urban sector most, option b) the rural sector most, option d) is a
compromise between the two. Options included in c) examine the possibility of
taxing one commodity and subsidizing the other to achieve some balance between
the two.
Il.8 Sensitivity Analysis
Data quality and availability is often quite limited for the agricultural
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sector of less developed countries. Even in the Korean case, sufficient doubt
surrounds the basic data that computed parameters of the demand and production
systems are subject to error, perhaps substantial error. It is important,
therefore, to ensure that the results obtained in the full model simulations
are not unduly sensitive to errors of the magnitude that might be expected in
these parameters. The role of sensitivity analysis, in this case, is to make
some appraisal of the reliability of the results of the project and to
pinpoint the parameters which need to be known with precision.
The focus of the sensitivity analysis is done by changing assumptions
concerning market equilibrium. In the current case, the alternative
assumptions vis a vis the labor market is an example. Here, results would
show the sensitivity of model output (particularly with regard to rural
household income and welfare) to judgements concerning the institutional
structure of the rural labor market.
More commonly, the values most subject to error are the underlying
parameters of production and consumption. The method proposed to analyze the
degree of sensitivity of model output to uncertainty regarding these values is
to re-run the policy experiments with a variety of values of the parameters.
The alternative values are determined by perturbing the estimated values
(either in the estimated version or the aggregate share version).
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Chapter III
Basic Results
III.1 Overview
The number of potential policies which can be examined within this
framework is fairly large. Further, for each of the policy experiments,
various assumptions concerning the institutional structure of the economy and
the underlying behavioral parameters may be employed. The results, therefore,
will be quite extensive. Discussion of the results will be divided into three
parts. In this chapter, the most important common threads which run through
the analysis will be discussed first. Following these very broad conclusions
will be a more detailed discussion of the way in which the model works under a
wide variety of the assumptions mentioned above. This will give a fairly
clear picture of the effects which the proposed policy changes are most likely
to have on the Korean economy. While many of the qualitative results and the
basic story are invariant to particular specifications of the model, a number
of conclusions are sensitive to such changes. In chapter IV the implications
of the various different ways of modelling the labor market, the income
distribution, the structure of demand and the structure of production are
discussed.
The various solutions to the model throw into sharp relief the
interaction, both complementary and competing, of the various goals of the
government: deficit reduction; increasing the real income of the public,
particularly in the rural sector; moderation of the cost of living in the
urban areas; improving the distribution of income; and, finally, approaching
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self sufficiency in grain consumption, particularly of rice. A distinct
pattern emerges concerning the effects of the proposed policy changes on the
government deficit and other indicators of national welfare.
The first main conclusion is that there is no way in which to satisfy all
of the goals of the government by simply changing the prices in the Grain
Management and Fertilizer Funds. The goals are essentially in competition
with each other and basic choices must be made concerning the relative
importance of each. To a large extent, the various goals may be grouped into
two broad sets which are usually in direct conflict with each other. In one
group are: a) the interests of the larger farmers or, depending on assumptions
concerning the rural labor market, the rural sector as a whole and b) the
achievement of self-sufficiency. In the other group are: a) large reductions
of the deficits with small changes in the values of policy instruments, b)
moderation of the cost of living in the urban areas, c) increasing national
income, and d) improvement of the lot of the very poor. 12/ The first set of
goals is promoted by maintaining current rural grain prices and raising urban
release prices. The second is furthered by reducing the support prices.
Hence, if the pricing policy of the two agricultural funds is the only type of
policy available, 132 a basic choice must be made between the rural and urban
sectors concerning who it is that must bear the burden of the deficit
reductions.
12 This last point may seem surprising since the rural sector is on average,
less well off than the urban. However, the distribution of income is
considerable more dispersed in the cities and it is there that the very
poorest live.
3/ Other policies might include changing the tax system, increasing rural
technology extension services or supporting rural off-form employment
opportunities.
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The second broad result of this exercise is that the proportional effects
of most of the examined policy changes on the government deficit are much
larger than the proportional effects on private sector production and
incomes. Further, price reductions in the rural sector have considerably more
impact on the deficits than comparable increases in the urban area.
Substitution possibilities, both in supply and demand relations, moderate the
impact of policy variables on the people, but exacerbate the effect on
government expenditure. On the supply side, the existence of traditional rice
as an alternative use of rice land leads to large elasticities of supply of
high yield rice and moderates the impact of a subsidy reduction on farm
incomes. On the demand side, a reduction of the support price may benefit
people in the rural sector as consumers. While the reduction in the cost of
living does not offset the reduction in incomes for all surplus producing
farmers it does provide a moderating influence for that particular policy.
Similar stories may be told for each of the rural sector policy
interventions. The greater the substitution possibilities on the supply side,
the greater will be this mediating effect on incomes.
The third broad conclusion is that in two markets there appear to be
fairly straight-forward solutions to the budget problems. In the barley
market, the loss in welfare of the rural producers engendered by a reduction
in the barley price is relatively small since even with the large subsidy, the
profitability of barley has always been low. As a result, a reduction in
price lowers output to a large extent, though incomes are not severely
affected. Since the supply response to price is so large, the effect on
government costs in the barley fund are drastically reduced when the price is
lowered. The only real goal (other than some loss in farm income) which must
be sacrificed is the desire to encourage barley consumption for its
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micronutrient content. Even on these grounds, gains in nutritional status are
facilitated by trade for barley which is cheap on world markets.
The other relatively unambiguous conclusion is that the Fertilizer Fund
operations serve simultaneously as a drain on resources and as a direct tax on
agriculture. It is already the intent of the Korea government to let current
committments to the foreign fertilizer producers expire, allowing for
improvements in efficiency of the domestic industry. The results of this
study confirm this as a desirable decision. Decreasing the home production
and letting the fertilizer price reflect international costs, helps achieve
three other policy goals. Deficits due to fertilizer, currently at 19 percent
of the total Grain Management and Fertilizer fund deficits can be eliminated
from the start. Total food production at current prices will rise, thus
contributing to the self-sufficiency goal. The expected gain in rice
production is near 3 percent if world prices of fertilizer are used. -14 At
the same time, the reduced price of this input raises the income of all
farmers. Since many of the examined policy choices will entail reductions in
rural incomes for the sake of government expenditure, the reduction in
fertilizer cost can be partial compensation for the farmers and still help in
the deficit.
The hardest questions, those in which the various governmental goals are
in direct competition and in which the predicted consequences are both larger
and more sensitive to model specification, surround the rice markets.
Therefore, for much of the subsequent discussion, policies concerning rice
14/ Some doubt surrounds this figure. It has been proposed that fertilizer
price currently would have an asymmetric effect on fertilizer use and
output. Since fertilizer use has increased substantially in recent years it
is possible that further use due to price reductions would be very small.
Reductions in use due to price increases, however are likely to be larger.
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will take center stage and the other policies will be discussed essentially as
adjuncts to the rice problem.
Finally, the Government of Korea has generally been considering policies
in the context of a closed agricultural economy, i.e., one with little
international trade. On the basis of the simulation results, it appears that
the most crucial decision to be made by the government concerns the value of
self-sufficiency. Deficits in either of the grain markets can be essentially
eliminated by closing the price gap between rural and urban sectors. 15/
However, if this is done in a closed economy, the opportunity of generating
either substantial government revenues or substantial price reductions in the
basic food grains for consumers would be lost. The results presented here
tentatively assess the size of these potential gains. To a large extent, the
basic tradeoff between the rural sector on the one hand and the government
budget and urban sector on the other hand, involves the decision of how much
agricultural imports to allow. Further examination of the agricultural sector
would require information on the value of foreign exchange to the economy as a
whole in order to assess the full costs involved in the choice between autarky
and international trade.
III.2 General Results
For the sake of simplicity, the results of only two of the versions of
the model will be presented. The basic results of the simulation exercises
are presented in Tables IA and IB which show the effects of changing one price
at a time, and in IIA and IIB which involve changing prices in all markets-in
order to eliminate all operating deficits. (All the tables are presented in
subsection III.4). The first set reveal the basic sensitivities of the main
15/ Abstracting from inventory accumulation and handling costs.
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indicators to individual components of the proposed policies. The second set
captures the important interactions between these policies. The "A" tables
represent the model with the assumption of a fixed supply of labor and
variable wages in the rural sector and use the econometric estimation of
demand parameters described in the appendix. The "B" tables employ the
assumption of fixed wages in agriculture and use a simplified version of the
demand system with unitary own price elasticities. The differences between
the two versions reflect most of the basic sensitivities inherent in the
analysis. Given that Korea does not appear to be a "surplus labor" economy
and that the demand parameters for Version A are derived from econometric
evidence, Version A is certainly the preferred model. Its superiority is
strongest for short run analyses where the labor force is fixed in the rural
sector. The alternative Version, B, is included in order to see the effect of
major changes in specifications.
Except for the self-sufficiency ratio, the entries in the table reflect
the percentage change in the variable indentified by the column heading when
the policy described by the row heading is put into effect. The self-
sufficiency ratio applies to only rice and is the actual value of the term:
(total rice consumption - rice imports)/total rice consumption. National real
disposable income is the weighted sum of changes of disposable income of all
eight groups plus the reduction of the deficit. This number reflects the
total gain in purchasing power of the economy, including the government. If
taxes were reduced by the same amount as the government deficit reduction,
this number would represent total percentage increases in private income
adjusted for price changes. This number does not take into account the
influence of the policies on the income distribution. The final columns are
the values of the changes in "Social Welfare" in which income groups are given
different weights. The deficit is assumed to be distributed to the public on
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a per capita basis 16/. The higher the value of the parameter, E , (see notes
at end of table for the definition of the Atkinson measure of welfare) the
more the poor are valued relative to the more affluent. As c becomes very
large, only the very poor are counted in the evaluation of social welfare
(this being Rawls [1970] criterion of justice).
III.2.1 Rice Market Interventions Reducing the Rural Support Price
The cost of operating the Grain Management Fund was approximately 3.5
percent of total central government expenditure in 1979. Closing the gap
between urban and rural prices, therefore, has potential for generating
important revenue gains. Responses of the economy to the reduction of the
6/ This assumption implies a very progressive tax rebate scheme. There are
other possible ways to redistribute the tax revenue though none affect the
results very much. Taxes may be reduced in proportion to those paid.
This would benefit the urban sector most - and the relatively affluent
within the sector especially. As a result, this measure would be a bit
lower as groups with little weight in the welfare function would get most
of the government revenue. A second possibility is to give the extra
onsources to the poor, either by reducing taxes borne by the poor or by
redirecting government expenditure. This would raise this measure, the
more so for large values of c. Finally, the government revenue may be
used to compensate the people who are adversely affected by a deficit
reducing policy. For the rural price reduction, this means returning the
deficit gain to the rural sector, particularly to larger farmers. This
has ambiguous effects on the social welfare measure (relative to per
capita revenue distribution) but holds open the possibility of removing
all objections to the policy. Unfortunately, full compensation is not
possible from the increase in government revenue due to rural price
reductions. Besides purely fiscal means of financing the deficit, there
exists the possibility of simply increasing the money supply or borrowing
in capital markets. Indeed, a combination of these has been the way In
which the GOK has financed the deficit until summer 1983. The
distributioned consequences of these changes in macroeconomic policy are
difficult to identify. Hence, instead of analyzing the monetary effects,
we transformed these effects into direct income effects via tax changes,
and analyzed alternative distributional consequences. There is clearly a
need to assess the distributional implications of reduction in deficits
associated with monetary changes. however, the recent change in
Government financing of GMF and FF, i.e., shifting them to the General
budget, make our model description more accurate.
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rural price by 10 percent and to the urban price are presented in rows a and b
in tables IA and B. An immediate result to note is that substitution
possibilities make the government deficit very sensitive to the purchase price
of high yield variety rice. When the amount of subsidy is reduced, the supply
of high yield variety rice falls quickly as land is transferred to traditional
strains. The supply elasticity of HYV rice ranges from about 1 to 1.5. On
the other hand, production of traditional rice picks up much of the slack and
increases with an elasticity which averages about .9. The net supply response
of both rices taken together is between .2 and .5, which is in line with many
previous estimates of short run supply elasticities of rice. 17/ The
government incurs costs only on the purchases of high yield variety rice.
Therefore, even though total supply elasticities for the composite crop of
rice are modest, the supply elasticity relevant to the government deficit is
extremely high. Furthermore, since the price of high yield rice falls, the
on-farm consumption of rice increases as well which further decreases the
marketed surplus. The deficit falls because of the reduced purchase price and
the sharply curtailed sales by farmers.
Farmer income is also directly affected by a reduction in the purchase
price. Due to the assumptions concerning substitution possibilities between
the types of rice (see Appendix B), a reduction in the producer price of high
yield rice results in an equal percentage reduction in the price of
traditional variety rice. The extra production of the latter types depresses
its price in the private market. Therefore, profits from both rice strains
decline. In the versions where rural wage rates are sensitive to demand,
wages decline as well. To the extent that the substitution assumptions made
17/ See, for example, Tolley et al.
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here are too strong, the reported effects exaggerate the reduction in rural
incomes.18/ As a first approximation, though, the substitution possibilities
assumed here are probably fairly accurate; historically, the acreage of high
yield did in fact respond quite sensitively to an increased subsidy rate.
The gain in government revenue resulting from the reduction of purchase
price can be decomposed into two parts - the saving of operating costs and the
gain in "tariff" revenue. The former simply reflects the reduction in the gap
between purchase and sales prices and the attendant reduction in production.
The latter is an indirect result of relaxing the import restrictions which are
necessary to clear the HYV rice market. With constant urban prices (and
demand) and reduced marketed surplus from the countryside, the HYV market
clears by increasing imports. Since world prices of rice are lower than the
current urban prices, the government gains revenue from the profit on these
sales. These earnings are equivalent to those which would be generated by
levying a tariff on imports equal to the gap between urban and world prices.
The two components are logically separable and it is a bit deceptive to
include the tariff gains as part of the reduction of the Grain Management Fund
cost though it is certainly net revenue to the government as a whole. The
relative magnitude of the two sources of income is illustrated in row b in
which the rural price is set equal to the urban price (minus handling costs)
in order to eliminate the operating deficit of the rice fund. In the absence
of tariff revenue the decrease in the deficit could only be about 40 percent,
8/ If substitution possibilities between the two grains are smaller than
assumed, neither the decline in prices (and profits) from traditional rice
nor the decline in labor demand and wages would be as large as reported
here. By the same token, the gains in government revenues would not be as
high either. Similarly, if the supply of labor was not perfectly
inelastic (in contrast to table IA), the impact on the wage component of
income would be smaller.
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that is, the contribution of rice to total deficit in the base period.
However, since imports increase to a large extent (to between 19 and 28
percent of consumption) the tariff revenue is equal to a large fraction of the
cost of the fertilizer and barley funds, and option b reduces the deficit by
60-98 percent. Caution should be taken at this point, however, since some
doubt surrounds the assumption that Korea can import rice at constant
international prices. If some monopsony power in world markets exists, the
cost of imports would rise. However, since the price differential between
urban and world prices is so high (world prices are 33% lower), a large scope
remains for revenue gains. In scenario a, where prices are reduced by only 10
percent and imports increase to between 12 and 13 percent of consumption, the
total gain is between 30 and 50 percent in the deficit, a substantial amount
of money.
The revenue savings from this policy is offset to some degree by possible
increases in the barley and fertilizer fund deficits. In some versions of the
model, lower rice prices lead to larger sales of barley to the government and
tend to increase costs in that fund. In all versions of the model, the
reduced total supply of rice leads to less use of fertilizer. This is
especially true since, in general, the high yield variety of rice requires
more fertilizer then does the traditional. Even though the Government sells
fertilizer to farmers at a loss, farm use is better than letting the
fertilizer go unsold or be dumped on world markets. The large reductions in
the rice deficit are offset to a small extent by the resultant increases in
fertilizer and perhaps barley.
Since the potential government deficit reduction is so large, and the
loss to each farmer appears much smaller in percentage terms, the issue of
compensation arises. If by redistributing the revenue gains to the farmers
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who suffer a decline in real income, the government can cover this loss, a
strong case can be made for phasing out an inefficient subsidy system. Direct
payments to the farmers from tax decreases or their equivalent from general
funds may be substituted for the subsidy in order to obtain the reduction in
the cost of living for urban workers and rural smallholders. Unfortunately,
no such direct repayment is feasible. While the total deficit reduction is
large, the reduction per rural household (or per acre) is not sufficient to
compensate all farmers for the price reduction solely through the increase in
government revenue. The gains to the urban sector would have to be
recaptured, in part, to make compensation possible. It is interesting to
note, however, that the reduction in real disposable income of the larger
farmers can be limited to 2 to 6 percent with compensation (by acreage owned)
in contrast to 7.5 to 14.6 percent without it.
The big gainers when rural prices are lowered are urban consumers and, if
wages are fixed, the rural poor. The urban cost of living is reduced since
the price of traditional rice everywhere falls with the rural price of HYV.
These cost savings can be as high as 1 percent of the urban cost of living.
For the landless and small farmers (who are net importers of rice), the
substantial reduction of the price of both varieties of rice lowers the cost
of living by about 4 percent in the case of zero operating deficit. When
wages are flexible, the reduction of demand for labor and hence, of wages
leads to losses of income in excess of this fall in the cost of living.
Aggregate Measures of Welfare
Since some members of society gain and others lose, the user of any
summary measure of welfare or economic performance must be willing to compare
standards of living across individuals. The measures used here employ
different weighting schemes designed to reflect social distaste for
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inequitable income distributions. The first measure, total personal income,
does not weight people differently and so measures the net gain or loss in
personal purchasing power. Government expenditure gains are evaluated on an
equal dollar for dollar basis with private incomes and no premium is given for
foreign exchange earnings. For the two scenarios which reduce the high yield
price, the country-wide real disposable income increases by between .16 and
.61 percent with a 10 percent decrease in price and by between .36 and 1.21
percent when the rice fund operating costs are zero. Thus, while decreases in
rural incomes are larger per family than the increases in urban and small
holder incomes, the fact that the urban sector is almost three times as large
as the rural sector determines the final direction of aggregate income
change.
It is possible to incorporate a concern for income distribution by
evaluating changes in income differently depending on the degree of affluence
of the person affected. An extra dollar received by a relatively poor person
could be considered more valuable than one received by a wealthier person. A
variety of such measures are available for this purpose. The one chosen is
the "Atkinson measure" defined in Appendix B and at the end of table IA. In
the last columns of the tables, the results given are the changes in this
measure with each policy. The higher the value of e , the more important is
the change in a poor person's status relative to that of a wealthier person.
Since the rural sector, on average, is less well off than the urban
sector, one would expect that the more sensitive to the poor is the measure of
welfare, the less attractive the policy of reducing the rural price will
appear. However, the actual results are more complicated than this. Since
the very poorest segment of society live in the urban sector, very "inequality
averse" evaluation criteria will improve with the reduction of their cost of
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living. The order of magnitude of this change is about one percent for the
case of reducing the rural price to the urban level. When the rural poor also
benefit from the price fall, this effect is even stronger. When inequality is
not an issue at all, the same general conclusion arises. However, for some of
the intermediate cases, where the distribution of income is of concern to the
policy maker but does not take the extreme form of caring only about the very
poorest group, the opposite effect is found. In these cases, the harm done to
the rural sector on average outweighs the gain to the urban sector. Thus, as
shown in the columns where e 1 and 2 in table Ia, a reduction in the rural
price of rice leads to a reduction in the measure of total welfare of .34 to
.89 percent. This result points out the importance of specifying the overall
goals and objectives of such policies very clearly. It is not sufficient to
say that the distribution of income is important. It is necessary to specify
"how much" in a relation to other goals of the government.
Migration
The model is explicitly short-run in nature and is not designed to
examine migration decisions in detail. However, certain long-run
possibilities are suggested by using different assumptions about the labor
market. In the short-run, the versions with endogenous wage rates apply.
Wages, in the space of one crop year, can fall giving the large predicted
decline in rural incomes (Table 1A, C). These versions assume that the size
of the rural population and labor force is fixed. One way of examining the
long-run consequences of the policy changes is to allow migration sufficient
to maintain the real wage in agriculture. The assumption, which follows a
long tradition in development theory, is that the real wage is constant. The
case which corresponds to this assumption is Table 1B. Here, instead of
declining demand for labor reducing the wage and incomes, the effect is
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entirely on the number of labor hours used. The reduction in demand can
roughly be associated with outmigration from the rural sector. If this is
true, the two alternative policies would cause (or speed up) migration by 6
percent and 10 percent of rural families, respectively.
Summary of Rural Price Reductions
In summary, reductions in the support price of rice will, on the "pro"
side, benefit net consumers of rice, decrease the deficit of the GMF
substantially and increase measures of weighted national income. Offsetting
this is a decline in the real incomes of farmers who sell rice to market and a
potentially substantial sacrifice of the self-sufficiency goal of the
government. These are the major tradeoffs which the government must address.
Urban Price Increases
The second set of policies involve increasing the urban price of HYV
rice. This is of particular importance since the Government of Korea
considers this method the leading contender for alleviating the deficit.
These results are found in rows C and D of all versions of Table I.
The consequences of this option are significantly different from lowering
the support prices. The demand for rice in the urban areas can be expected to
go down significantly, the elasticity of the decline ranges from -1 to -.4 in
the runs examined. Since the rural price is left unchanged, total production
is relatively fixed (small changes occur in order to accommodate changes in
relative consumption of HYV to traditional rice in the urban sector). As a
result, the smaller demand for rice will lead to fewer imports. By the
calculations found in this analysis, Korea could come very close to self-
- 42 -
sufficiency in rice and may end up exporting some on
average. 19/
Government expenditure is reduced by approximately the same percentage as
the increase in the urban price. The fact that the numbers are so similar is
coincidental. The reason that the decline in the deficit is so much smaller
when urban price is raised as opposed to when the rural price is raised is
that a) the total level of marketed surplus is left unchanged, therefore, for
small changes in price (rows a and c) there is no supply response magnifying
the deficit decline and b) the implicit tariff revenue declines as imports
decline and, when exports are expected, there is a loss sustained on
unprofitable exports.
Since rice supply, rural incomes and urban nominal incomes do not change
at all, the deficit is reduced (albeit by less than via the rural price
changes) and the country moves closer to self-sufficiency, this policy seems
to be quite attractive. However, there are hidden costs imposed by this
policy which the government may want to consider. The urban cost of living
rises to a substantial extent. For the poorest urban group, increasing the
price of the basic staple grain by 10 percent reduces their real disposable
income by between .9 percent and 1.2 percent. If the rice deficit is to be
closed, this becomes 2 to 3 percent. For the urban sector as a whole, the
increase in prices reduces real income by 1.5 to 1.6 percent when the deficit
is eliminated. The per capita income loss in the urban area when prices rise
is smaller than the loss with rural price reductions. However, since the
19/ It should be noted that these calculations abstract from any income growth
or population growth in the urban sector and should not be interpreted as
a prediction that the country would actually export rice. The import
bill, though, would certainly be much reduced, helping to achieve greater
self-sufficiency.
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urban sector is so much larger than the rural sector, the total loss to the
national economy is larger when the urban price is raised. Column 3 of Table
I gives the change in national disposable income in real terms. This number
includes the savings in government revenues from reducing the deficit. When
the policy impact on the various classes are weighted by their incomes, these
results are strengthened. Again, since the urban poor are both numerous and
most deprived in society, measures of welfare which are dependent on the
income distribution will respond badly to increases in urban prices. This
general conclusion is invariant to the choice of aversion measure discussed
above.
The tradeoff facing the government considering this policy is between
self-sufficiency and deficit reduction on one hand versus loss of purchasing
power in the urban sector. If this increase in the cost of living leads to
higher wage demands, a secondary effect on the cost of export goods may
result.
III.2.2 Barley Market Policies
In many ways, the analysis of policy intervention in the barley market is
easier than in rice. Profits in barley are relatively modest. They are
estimated to be near 23500 won/ha in the base year as opposed to 115500 won/ha
for high yield rice. This has two main consequences for proposed price
reductions in rural areas. First, the net impact on incomes is very small.
The reduction in profits (small to begin with) is relatively minor. A 20
percent reduction in the price of barley reduces nominal disposal incomes of
the largest producers by about .4 percent in the fixed wage case and by less
when wages fall. On the other hand, consumption of barley is relatively
larger in the rural sector than in the urban. Rural residents, as consumers,
have this price decline cushioned to some extent. Indeed, with prices
- 44 -
determined completely by government fiat, many farmers may become net
importers of barley when prices fall. This is the case for the simulations
presented here. On balance, then, the cost to producers is lowAo/
One difficulty arises from the formal model which illustrates an
important problem with the barley fund. Since the country does not currently
import barley, the conclusion that the rural sector as a whole is a net
importer of grain when the price falls 20 percent is unusual. The implication
is that most of the nation's supply comes from government release of inventory
accumulated in the past years. Clearly the policy is not sustainable over any
significant period of time. When this inventory is exhausted (within two to
three years at the implied rate), the chosen prices become infeasible and
prices to consumers would be bid up or reliance on international trade will be
necessary.
The alternative policy of increasing urban price has mirror-image welfare
implications and long run problems. Since barley takes such a small fraction
of expenditures, the proposed price increases have little impact on welfare.
As opposed to the rice market case, the gain in government revenues due to
raising urban prices roughly compensates the increase in cost of living when
evaluated on a dollar for dollar basis. On welfare grounds, raising the price
in urban areas is not very damaging. However, as in the rural price scenario,
the long run implications of maintaining this policy pose serious problems.
Raising the urban price of barley to close the barley fund deficit reduces the
total demand for barley. The exact amount of the reduction depends crucially
20/ A word of caution is required, though, here since the current model
abstracts from regional variation in barley production. In certain
regions of the country, barley production is a major contribution to
income and a policy of price reduction may have a more serious impact than
national averages would show.
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on the demand parameters. In the estimated case (Table IA) the demand is very
inelastic and the reduction is small. There is already considerably more
production then consumption, giving rise to large annual increases in barley
inventories. This is an unsustainable policy and a large waste of resources
21/. Reducing demand can only make an untenable situation worse. So, while
the welfare effects of the proposed changes are modest, the scope of feasible
policies is limited by material balance concerns in the absence of
international trade. One obvious candidate for eliminating the deficit and
ensuring equation of supply and demand is to mimic the behavior of a private
market (by setting the corresponding prices) or to allow private trade in
barley (eliminating government storage and handling). With relatively elastic
supply, the equilibrium price will be very close to the current rural price (a
reduction of 3-5%) and much of the burden will fall on the urban consumers
(Table II row e). However, this cost is modest and the government would save
approximately 15 percent of the total GMF deficit. The goal which would be
sacrificed is the encouragement of barley consumption for nutritional
reasons. Since demand is relatively inelastic for barley, though, absorption
of increased production via the price mechanism is limited. If increased
consumption is desired, per se, other methods such as education or advertising
will be needed if large deficits and unstable inventories are to be avoided.
In 1983 Korea has achieved its record barley harvest. This calls for a
large increase in inventories and in deficit. It is interesting to note
that the Government paper, the Korea Herald, devoted a full editorial in
June to persuade consumers to shift their consumption pattern in favor of
barley. It is very unlikely, though, that in the short or even medium run
Koreans' tastes will change significantly to absorb such large barley
production.
- 46 -
III.2.3 Fertilizer Fund Interventions
Since the Government of Korea is already planning to eliminate the
contracts for production of fertilizer by the foreign investors, much of the
current analysis is merely confirmation of the wisdom of this decision. The
most interesting comparison to be made in considering the effect of fertilizer
sale price changes is between selling at current purchase prices (to appraise
the income effect of eliminating the current deficit) and selling at world
prices (to appraise the maximum response to be expected when the present
agreements are phased out).
The basic conclusion drawn from the simulations is that the present high
fertilizer price (relative to world prices) serves as a direct tax on
agricultural incomes. Raising the price to current purchase price would
obviously eliminate the deficit, but at the expense of rural incomes. Without
further policy changes the urban sector is unaffected. The reduction in the
deficit is due, directly, to the elimination of fertilizer fund costs and
indirectly by reducing the production and marketed surplus of the grains.
Lower grain sales reduces the grain management deficits by nearly the same
amount as the direct reduction in the fertilizer fund when the Cobb-Douglas
specification of technologies used. These deficit reductions come directly at
the expense of rural incomes, by reducing profit per acre for crops. The
predicted differences in disposable income for cases where the sale price is
between the factory price and the world price is about 1.4 percent for the
largest farmers, when wages are held fixed, and about 2 percent when wages are
endogenous.
The calculation of the impact of fertilizer prices is sensitive to
assumptions made concerning the underlying production functions. Conventional
wisdom concerning the use of fertilizer indicates that additional application
- 47 -
of fertilizer would have very little impact on output and, therefore, that the
Cobb-Douglas specification using average share data would overstate this
factor's marginal contribution. Modifying the translog specification to
capture the implied inelasticity of factor demand yields much less impact on
production and deficits in the grain management fund. The benefit of lowering
the price to world levels on self-sufficiency and the benefit of raising price
on the grain funds are both moderated by incorporating this a priori
information on production into the model. The basic effect under these
circumstances is on rural incomes. In the long run, reliance on world prices
can benefit the farmer as a partial compensation for grain support price
reductions.
III.3.1 Multi-Market Interventions
Policies which entail closing the gap between purchase and release price
in all three markets are presented in Table II. Rows la and b present the
case in which the rural prices of both rice and barley are reduced to their
urban level. Rows 2a and b show the case in which both prices are set to
their current rural level. Rows 3a and b show the case in which the barley
price is lowered and the rice price raised and Rows 4a and b show the reverse
case, where rice prices equal the current urban level and barley prices equal
their rural level. What distinguishes case a from case b in these scenarios
is the treatment of fertilizer. In each of these runs, row a entails raising
the release price of fertilizer to the current contractual factory price,
thereby losing no money on each unit sold. Case b entails lowering the
release price to world levels, thereby simulating the case in which home
production of fertilizer is required to compete with potential supplies from
abroad. Since both of these cases imply some cost to the government given
current institutional arrangements, the overall deficit is never actually
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reduced to zero. When fertilizer prices are raised to purchase price, some of
the supply which the government is obligated to buy will be left unsold. When
they are lowered, a gap is opened between purchase and release prices again
which lead to increased deficits.
The final two scenarios examined in Table II are far reaching policies of
special interst. Row e simulates the case of a free market economy which is
closed to international trade in agricultural products. This can be
interpreted either as a case in which the government turns all marketing
operations over to the private sector or, perhaps more realistically, where
the government attempts to mimic the behavior of a private market but
maintains control of the grains for seasonal stabilization purposes. Row f
presents the case in which the economy is opened to free trade in agricultural
products. This case assumes that Korea is a price taking country in the
relevant markets i.e., that these prices are determined entirely outside of
the country. Qualifications to the numerical results presented here will be
necessary to the extent that Korea can influence the price of traditional
rice, which it is most likely to import.
Many of the effects of scenarios 1 to 4 in this table are similar to the
sum of the effects of their constituent policies. For example, in row la
where barley and rice prices are lowered to their urban levels and fertilizer
prices are raised, the net effect on rural incomes and production is roughly
the same as would be found by adding the effects of rows b, d and j in table 1
in which each of these changes occur separately. However, a number of
deviations from this general rule show up and provide some lessons for overall
policy formation.
First of all, it is of some interest to see how much the rural sector
might be hurt if all prices are changed to their disadvantage (row la), and
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how much the urban sector is hurt when all policies favor farmers (row 2b).
Again, these numbers depend on the particular model examined, but in the
flexible rural wage case, the fall in the income of the largest farmers is on
the order of 15 percent when there is a general urban bias in policy. For the
rural sector as a whole, the number is around 12 percent. The deficit is
essentially eliminated but the self-sufficiency ratio falls to about 84
percent. The value of national real income rises by about .3 percent.
When the rural sector is favored in the three relevant policies, the
urban cost of living rises by about four and half percent. The deficit is
reduced by about 40 percent (this being far from 100 percent due to the
existence of the fertilizer deficit) and the country is essentially self-
sufficient in rice, since rice consumption falls by 5 to 6 percent. The
overall measure of national income falls by three percent. The differences
between strong rural and strong urban biases in policy formation are,
therefore, quite substantial.
Second, one important lesson emerges from the simultaneous consideration
of the available policies. When considering a reduction in the rural price of
grains, the substitution possibilities on both the supply and demand sides
imply that rice and barley prices should be changed together. While there is
no direct substitution between barley and rice in production, being grown in
different seasons, there appears to be an indirect effect through effects on
the cost of labor. Thus, if the reduction of the support price of rice
results in a reduced demand for labor, barley production may be encouraged if
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wages are flexible. 22/ Since the two grains are substitutable in demand, the
added production of barley and the decreased demand both lead to increased
marketed surplus. This leads directly to increased government costs. To
illustrate the net effect, we can compare the deficit reduction in row la to
the sum of deficit reductions in rows b, d and j in Table IA. When all
markets experience a price change, the deficit is reduced by 93 percent as
opposed to a sum of 83 percent for the individual changes. The difference of
10 percent is due to the fact that part of the deficit is no longer shifted
from the rice market to the barley market and vice versa. To avoid this
offset, the two substitutable goods should be treated in the same way. If one
of the rural prices is to be lowered, it is advisable to lower the other at
the same time.
The same argument, however, cannot be made in the case of urban price
increases. In this case, the substitution effect (in consumption alone)
increases the effectiveness of price changes on government deficits if the
price change occurs in isolation. In this case, for example, an increase in
the price of rice would lead to an increase for the demand for barley and,
therefore greater revenue in the barley fund. This would tend to reinforce
the deficit gains of increasing rice prices. The admission of
substitutability leads to the general rule that urban prices may be treated
independently, the spillover effects do not interfere with policy
22/ Again, this is most likely to be the case in large barley producing
regions. Also, the issue of seasonality arises at this point. As
modelled, no distinction is made between rice and barley seasons. If the
labor markets in both seasons are substantially independent of one another
(i. e. wages follow a seasonal pattern and do not merely reflect average
annual productivity) these results would need to be modified. In
particular, the impact of a drop in barley prices would have much less
effect on the wage rates relevant to rice production and vice versa.
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effectiveness. However, care must be taken when dealing with the rural sector
where the possibility of spillovers may hamper the effect of single price
changes in reducing the deficit.
III.3.2 Free Trade and Closed Economy Laissez Faire
Examination of every possible policy agenda is impossible. Two natural
benchmark cases, however, are those which mimic the effects of allowing a free
private market to operate in agriculture. The results presented here are for
the cases with and without international trade.
The closed economy model is presented in row 5 in table II. This shows
the case where the government tries to imitate the workings of the private
economy in the abscence of world trade. In the case where there is no
uncertainty as to the level of production, this is exactly the same result as
if the government were to leave the agricultural marketing business
completely. If a private market is subject to price or yield uncertainty (due
to weather or farmer uncertainty concerning other farmers' production plans)
the results presented here would not be the same as if a competitive market
actually existed. These results are the combined effects of the average price
which the market would have generated plus the effect of government price
stabilization. The assumption is that the farmer knows the price of his
product with certainty.
When the current subsidy program is eliminated but the economy is
isolated from world markets in the closed economy laissez faire case, both the
urban and rural sectors share the burden of removing the deficit. However,
the urban sector seems to absorb most of the costs. In the barley market, the
very large elasticity of supply ensures that the equilibrium price of barley
will not fall very far. The original (actual 1979) rural price of 267 won/kg
falls to 250 won/kg. This has little effect on the rural sector but
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represents almost a doubling of the urban price of barley. In high yield
rice, the equilibrium price is 4 percent lower for the rural sector but 15
percent higher for the urban sector. The effect on the urban sector is
mitigated however, by the fact that the price of traditional rice falls by the
same amount as the rural price fall. Overall, rural real disposable incomes
fall by between .36 percent and .81 percent while urban disposable incomes
fall by between .45 percent and 3.5 percent.
Starting from the closed economy equilibrium, the effect of opening the
agricultural sector to trade allows us to isolate the gain attributable to
deficit reduction and that attributable to trade effects in the analysis of
rural price reductions already discussed. It can also be of interest per se
as a means of assessing the costs implied by the pursuit of self-sufficiency.
Table II row f (both versions) shows the results for a full, free trade
equilibrium. The results should be considered suggestive rather than
definitive since there is substantial doubt surrounding the ability to import
at constant prices. Assuming prices to rice with imports has the effect of
moderating all changes.
The most important item to note is the change in the goal of self-
sufficiency. Due to the difference in demand assumptions, there is a wide
range in which this value coula fall: .48 for the fixed wage (high supply
elasticity) and high demand elasticity for rice case to about .73 for the
endogenous wage, estimated demand parameter case. While substantially
different, both cases imply a significant compromise of the self-sufficiency
goal. As stated above, we place a lot more confidence in the endogenous wage,
estimated demand parameter case and hence we believe the decline in self
sufficiency to be of smaller magnitude.
On the other hand, the gain in national disposable income is also
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substantial, increasing by 2-3 percent in one year. This gain aggregates the
very large gain in the urban sector with the devastating reduction in farm
income. The free trade case is the most dramatic illustration of the basic
tradeoffs exposed in this model: self-sufficiency and rural incomes on the one
hand; national income, urban incomes and budget relief on the other.
While the presented free trade scenario is unrealistic, the results show
the opportunities available in relaxing on the margin the autarkic position of
Korean agriculture.
III.4 Tables describing the alternative policy scenarios.
Table 1A
Single Price Changes
Rural Wage Endogenous, Using Estimted Demand Parameters
Deficit Change due Deficit Change due Total Self Sufficiency National Real
to Government to Tariff Deficit Ratio of Rice Disposable Rice Supply Rice Barley Barley
Domestic Expenditures 1/ Revenues 2/ (Base Year - .93) 3/ Income 4,5/ Total HYV Traditional Demand Supply Demand
(A) (B) (A)+(B)
High Yield Variety
Rice Prices
1a. Rural Price decreaes -22.2 -9.8 -32.0 .88 .13 -5.90 -11.41 3.18 .43 4.64 -4.68
10l
lb. Rural Price decreeass -36.6 -21.8 -58.4 .81 .32 -13.29 -25.45 7.2 1.00 9.96 -10.26
to Urban level
lc. Urban Price Increases -20.6 1.0 -19.6 .94 -. 44 -. 07 - 68 .95 -1.10 0 1.29
lOX
Id. Urban Price Increses -35.0 14.1 -49.1 .96 -1.11 -. 18 -1.70 2.38 2.86 0 3.19
to Rural level (26.82)
Barley Prices
le. Rural Price decreses -17.5 4.7 -12.8 .96 .012 1.64 3.46 1.46 -1.38 -35.5 4.84
If. Rural Price decreases -26.3 9.1 -17.2 .98 .02 3.14 6.65 -2.80 -2.64 -79.87 17.06
to Urban level (54.11)
lg. Urban Price Increases -0.9 -0.3 -1.2 .93 .005 0 -1.09 .152 .16 0 -2.05
20X
lb. Urban Price Increases -3.9 -1.1 -5.0 .93 .02 0 -4.65 .65 .67 0 -9.64
Rural level (1182)
Fertilizer Pricea
li Raised 202 -6.35 -0.7 -7.05 .93 .018 -. 70 -1.04 -1.6 -. 16 -3.92 -. 21
I1. Raised to Porchaae Price -15.75 -2.0 -17.75 .92 .029 -1.91 -2.73 - 54 -. 44 -7.95 -. 47
1k. Lowered to World Price 6.82 0.7 +7.52 .94 -. 028 .67 .94 -. 181 .12 2.81 .20
Table IA Cont.
Rural Real Disposable Income Urban Real Disposable Income Atkinson Index 2.3/
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 l-0 e .5 e-1 e-2 e-
Ia. Rural Price decreases -3.54 -5.01 -5.78 -6.94 .62 .62 .62 .62 .13 -.16 -.34 -.63 1.37
101
lb. Rural Price decreases -7.24 -10.25 -12.35 -14.62 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 .32 -.23 -.40 -.83 1.95
to Urban level
Ic. Urban Price Increases 0 0 0 0 -.91 -.73 -.63 -.55 -.44 -.37 -.31 -.19 -.60
10%
Id. Urban Price Increases 0 0 0 0 -2.28 -2.10 -1.59 -1.08 -1.11 -.95 -.79 -.52 -1.40
to Rural level (26.8Z)
Barley Prices
le. Rural Price decreases -2.82 -2.01 -1.51 -1.02 0 0 0 0 .012 -. 20 -. 28 *-.42 .40
If. Rural Price decreases -4.32 -3.18 -2.22 -1.30 0 0 0 0 .02 -.33 -.42 -.72 .70
to Urban level (54.11)
Ig. Urban Price Increases 0 0 0 0 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.01 .005 .007 .008 .011 .088
201
Ih. Urban Price Increases 0 0 0 0 -.10 -.08 -.07 -.06 .02 .03 .04 .05 .04
Rural level (1181)
Fertilizer Prices
Ii. Raised 20X -.48 -.49 -.49 -.51 0 0 0 0 .018 .008 -.002 -.017 .195
Ij. Raised to Purchased -1.28 -1.31 -1.33 -1.39 0 0 0 0 .029 -.001 -.030 -.075 .488
Price
Ik. Lowered to World Price .459 .467 .475 .494 0 0 0 0 -.028 -.020 -.012 0 .209
Table IB
Single Price Change
Fixed Rural Wage, Using Unitary Price Elasticities
Deficit Change due Deficit Change
to Government due to Tariff Self National Rice Supply Rice Barley Barley
Domestic Expenditures 1/ Revenues 2/ Total Deficit Sufficiency Real Disposable Total HYV Traditional Demand Demand Demand(A) (B) (A) + (B) Ratio of Rice 3/ Income 4/,5/
High Yield Variety
Rice Prices
la. Rural Price decreases 
-24.38 
-21.7 
-46.08 .B4 .61 -5.7 -14.14 9.96 6.7 0 -.62loX
lb. Rural Price decreases -50.40 
-48.2 
-98.60 .69 1.21 -11.6 -30.74 24.05 16.10 0 -1.24
to Urban level
Ic. Urban Price Increases -15.31 4.8 
-10.51 .98 -. 14 0 0 0 -3.6 0 0
10X
Id. Urban Price Increases -29.37 6.0 -23.37 1.03 .37 0 0 0 -8.5 0 0
to Rural level (26.8Z)
Barley Prices
Ie. Rural Price decreases 21.30 0.5 -20.80 .94 .31 0 0 0 0 26.35 4.7
If. Rural Price decreases 16.10 1.0 -15.10 .94 .40 0 0 0 0 -62.07 B1.9
to Urban level (54.11
Ig. Urban Price Increases 
-2.75 0 
-2.75 .94 -.02 0 0 0 0 0 -13.5
201
lb. Urban Price Increases -16.24 0 -16.24 .94 .14 0 0 0 0 0 -44Rural level (fISZ)
Fertilizer Prices
li. Raised 201 
-8.88 
-1.7 
-10.58 .93 .09 -.92 -1.41 -.02 0 -3.49 -.04
ij. Raised to Purchase 
-22.34 
-4.7 
-27.04 .93 .22 -2.50 -3.82 -.04 0 -9.24 -.03
Price
Ik. Lowered to World Price 9.37 1.7 11.07 .94 -.1 .89 1.37 .015 0 3.45 .04
Table IB Cont.
Rural Real Disposable Income 6/ Urban Real Disposable 7/ Atkinson Indes 8, 9/
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 C-0 c- S e1 o-2 C e
Ia. Rural Price decreases .41 -1.61 -2.76 -3.93 .56 .47 .39 .26 .61 .52 .41 .28 .60
10l
Ib. Rural Price decreases 1.42 -2.81 -5.15 -7.49 1.28 1.06 .88 .59 1.21 1.02 .86 .64 1.35
to Urban level
Ic. Urban Price Increases 0 0 0 0 -1.25 -.82 -.47 -.07 -.14 -.22 -.35 -1.08 -1.21
1O0
Id. Urban Price Increases 0 0 0 0 -3.09 -2.02 -1.17 -.18 .37 .22 .26 .28 -2.89
to Rural level (26.81)
Barley Prices
le. Rural Price decreases .32 .19 .11 -. 01 0 0 0 0 .31 .33 .35 .38 .06
If. Rural Price decreases 1.26 .98 .74 .38 0 0 0 0 .40 .33 .35 .38 .04
to Urban level (54.1S)
lg. Urban Price Increases 0 0 0 0 -. 02 -. 02 -. 02 -. 025 -. 02 -. 017 -. 015 -. 022 -. 007
201
lb. Urban Price Increases 0 0 0 0 -. 09 -. 09 -. 09 -. 09 .14 -. 07 -. 07 -. 09 -. 03
Rural level (1I8I)
Fertilizer Prices
Xi. Raised 20S -. 11 -. 21 -. 28 -. 32 0 0 0 0 .09 .01 .01 .01 -. 03
Ii. Raised to Purchase -. 25 -. 57 -. 73 -. 88 0 0 0 0 .22 .04 .02 .03 .09
Price
Ik. Lowered to World Price .08 .21 .27 .31 0 0 0 0 -. 1 -. 05 -. 05 -. 05 -. 03
Table IC
Rural Wage Endogenous, Unitary Price Eleasticities
Deficit Change due Deficit Change
to Government due to Tariff Self National Rice Supply Rice Barley Barley
Domestic Expenditures 1/ Revenues 2/ Total Deficit Sufficiency Real Disposable Total bYV Traditional Denand Demand Demand
(A) (B) (A) + (B) of Rice Ratio 3/ Income 4/15/
ighb Yield Variety
Rice Prices
lb. Rural Price decreases -46.42 -38.2 -84.62 .72 .88 -9.04 -25.61 21.90 15.80 3.6 -1.76
to Urban level
Id. Urban Price Increases -31.27 7.9 -23.37 1.03 - 37 0 0 0 8.5 0 0
to Rural level (26.8S)
If. Rural Price decreases
to Urban level (54.11) -17.38 3.9 -13.48 .97 .28 3.06 5.51 -1.53 0 -59.13 76.75
lb. Urban Price Increases -16.24 0 -16.24 .94 .14 0 0 0 0 0 -44
Rural level (118S)
Ij. Fertilizer Price Ralsed -19.6 -4.1 -23.7 .92 .13 -1.95 -2.81 -. 33 0 -7.95
Raised to Purchase
Price
Table IC Cont.
Rural Real Disposable Income 6/ Urban Real Disposable 7/ Atkinson Index 8,9/
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 e0 lh e-1 e2 e-
Ib. Rural Price decreases -6.2 -9.1 -10.6 -12.5 1.28 1.06 .88 .59 .88 .54 .22 -.31 1.32
to Urban level
Id. Urban Price Increases 0 0 0 0 -3.09 -2.02 -1.17 -.18 -.37 -.79 -.72 -.59 -2.89
to Rural level (26.8Z)
If. Rural Price decreases -.25 -3.8 -3.8 -4.5 0 0 0 0 .28 .23 .17 .08 .05
to Urban level (54.1)
Ih. Urban Price Increases 0 0 0 0 -.09 -.09 -.09 -.09 .14 .09 .08 .07 -.002
Rural level (118%)
I]. Fertilizer Price Raised -.81 -.95 -.98 -1.12 0 0 0 0 .13 .11 .09 .06 .09
Raised to Purchase
Price
TABLE II A
MULTIMARKET INTERVENTIONS
Rural Wage Endogenous, Fully Estimated System
Deficit Change due Deficit Change
to Government due to Tariff Self National Rice Supply Rice Barley Barley
Domestic Expenditures 1/ Revenues 2/ Total Deficit Sufficiency Real Income 4/, 5/ Total HYV Traditional Demand Demand Demand
(A) (B) (A) + (B) Ratio of Rice=3/
Rural
llal. Rice and Barley -74.7 -4.1 -78.8 .903 .18 -5.79 -9.48 .458 -2.44 -76.88 8.04
Prices to Urban level;
Fertilizer Price rises
to Government Purchase
Price
Ilaii. AS above with wrld -62.55 -1.0 -63.55 .924 .03 -3.10 -5.42 .814 -2.11 -73.92 13.15
Fertilizer Price
lIb. Rural Barley Price -70.19 6.6 -63.59 .864 .40 .864 2.41 -1.76 -4.34 -78.29 16.6
falla to Urban level;
Urban High Yield Rice
price rises to
farmgate level
lIc. Urban Prices -52.94 5.3 -47.64 .929 1.47 -1.97 -3.93 1.34 -1.44 -7.91 -8.80
both rlse to faregate
levels
Ild. Urban Barley Price -43.87 -13.1 -56.97 .849 -.03 -8.81 16.33 3.93 .801 -2.97 -14.3
rises to farmgate level;
Rural High Yield Lice
prices fall to Urban
level
Ile. Closed economy laiase 1.00 1.00 -1.5 2.83 3.88 1.06 -4.25 -28.22 -. 94
faire equilibrium
llf. Free Trade equilibrium 1.00 .731 2.48 -23.5 -39.9 4.26 -.69 -83.15 -12.94
Table II-A Cont.
Rural Real Disposable Income 6/ Urban Real Disposable Income 7/ Atkinson Index _,9/
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 £-0 E D.5 E-1 E-2 C. X
Ilat. Rice and Barley -10.61 -10.65 -10.77 -11.22 .73 .73 .73 .73 .18 -. 40 -. 66 -. 98 .80
Prices to Urban level;
Fertilizer Price rises
to Government Purchase
Price
Ilaji. As above vith world -9.40 -9.42 -9.50 -9.76 .73 .73 .73 .73 .03 -.32 -.59 -.89 .75
Fertilizer Price
IIb. Rural Barley Price -5.98 -4.3 -3.47 -2.71 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 -.40 -.85 -.82 -1.00 -. 28
falls to Urban level;
Urban High Yield Rice
price rises to
farngate level
lIc. Urban Prices -1.28 -1.31 -1.33 -1.39 -2.40 -2.40 -2.40 -2.40 -1.47 -1.35 -1.24 -1.04 -1.10
both rise to farmgate
levels
Ild. Urban Barley Price -5.3 -7.2 -8.2 -9.46 -. 51 -. 51 -. 51 -. 51 -. 03 -. 26 -. 40 -. 58 -. 78
rises to farmgate level;
Rural High Yield Rlice
prices fall to Urban
level
Ile. Closed economy laisse -1.15 .135 .8 1.52 -4.63 -3.89 -3.63 -3.50 -1.5 -1.3 -1.01 -. 57 -1.15
faire equilibrium
IIf. Free Trade equilibrium -18.7 -20.6 -24.8 -28.7 8.25 7.47 6.70 6.20 2.48 .88 -. 77 -3.82 6.74
Table IIB
Multi Market Interventions
Fixed Rural Wage, Unitary Price Elasticities
Deficit Change due Deficit Change
to Government due to Tariff Self National Rice Supply Rice Barley Barley
Domestic Expenditures 1/ Revenues 2/ Total Deficit Sufficiency Real Disposable Total HYV Traditional Demand Demand Demand
(A) (B) (A) + (B) Ratio of Rice 3/ Income 4,5/
Rural
lIa-i. Rice and Barley Prices -66.3 
-29.7 -96. .77 1.21 -8.89 -19.96 11.77 7.93 -62.12 68.71
to Urban level; Fertilizer
Prices rises to Government
Purchase Price
Ila-li As above with world -52.6 
-24.0 
-76.6 .81 1.09 -5.86 -15.32 11.82 7.93 -56.82 68.72Fertilizer Ptice
IIb-i Rural Barley Price falls -51.95 2.1 
-49.85 .96 .35 -2.50 -3.80 -0.7 -4.66 -62.12 70.29
to Urban level; Urban High
Yield Rice price rises to
farmgate level
lib-il As above with world -35.92 11.3 -24.62 1.00 .19 .89 1.39 -.02 -4.66 -56.82 70.29Fertilizer Price
lIc-i Urban Prices both rise -50.13 2.1 -48.03 .98 .08 -2.50 -3.82 -.04 -4.66 -9.24 -15.72
to farmgate levels
lIc-ii As above witb world -30.0 11.3 -18.7 .99 -.13 .89 1.37 .015 -.467 3.45 -15.57Fertilizer Price
lid-i Urban Barley Price rises -64.5 
-29.7 
-94.2 .77 .43 -8.89 -19.98 11.81 7.93 -9.24 -16.46
to farmgate level; Rural
Higb Yield Rice prices fall
to Urban level
lid-ii Aa above with world -46.7 
-24.0 
-70.7 .81 .77 -5.86 -15.35 11.86 7.93 3.45 -16.33Fertilizer Price
Ile Closed economy laisses 
-100 1.00 .90 -.09 -1.09 
-3.55 -3.06 -13.57faire equilibrium
lIf Free Trade equilibrium 
-100 .48 3.33 -20.10 -63.68 61.25 58.60 -68.91 115.0
Table IIB Cont.
Rural Real Disposable Income 6/ Urban Real Disposable 7/ Atkinson Index 8,9/
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 e-0 e-.5 e-1 -2 e..
IIa-i Rice and Barley Prices 1.49 -1.41 -3.08 -4.83 .66 .55 .46 .31 1.21 1.3 1.41 1.5 2.84
to Urban level; Fertilizer
Prices rises to Government
Purchase Price
IIa-ii As above with world 1.72 -. 84 -2.34 -3.97 .66 .55 .46 .31 1.09 1.19 1.26 1.38 2.64
Fertilizer Price
IIb-i Rural Barley Price falls .86 .31 -. 05 -. 48 -1.63 -1.06 -. 61 .09 .35 .3 .16 -. 15 -. 33
to Urban level; Urban High
Yield Rice price rises to
farmgate level
IIb-ii As above with world 1.25 1.05 .89 .02 -1.63 -1.06 -. 61 -. 09 .19 .2 .11 -. 07 -. 98
Fertilizer Price
IIc-i Urban Prices both rise -.25 -.57 -.73 -.89 -1.71 -1.15 -.70 -.01 .08 .07 .01 -.14 -.46
to farmgate levels
IIc-ii As above with world .82 2.11 2.76 3.13 -1.71 -1.85 -.70 -.01 -.13 .05 .00 -.16 -1.24
Fertilizer Price
Ild-i Urban Barley Price rises .30 -2.32 -3.76 -5.18 +.58 +.47 +.37 +.23 .43 .38 .20 .23 3.02
to farmgate level; Rural
High Yield Rice prices fall
to Urban level
lId-ii As above with world .58 -1.67 -2.96 -4.22 +.58 +.47 +.37 +.23 .77 .22 .15 .12 2.40
Fertilizer Price
Ile Closed economy laisses .04 -.20 -.34 -.48 -1.49 -.99 -.59 0 .90 .42 .96 1.03 1.11
faire equilibrium
IIf Free trade equilibrium 6.10 -1.42 -5.95 -10.63 7.94 5.65 3.83 1.03 3.33 3.35 3.74 4.21 10.54
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Notes to the Tables
1/ This part includes the change in government costs due to the price
differential multiplied by quantity processed plus the handling cost.
2/ This part includes the change in the government deficit due to
changes in tariff revenues, e.g. if the rural price of rice is
decreasing, there will be a reduction in the marketed supply of rice
and in order to equilibrate the market at these prices, rice imports
will increase. The increase in imports which are sold to urban
consumers at a price higher than the purchase price of imports, the
international price, increases government revenues and hence reduces
the government deficit.
3/ (Total consumption - imports) . total consumption. Expressed in
levels.
4/ Total private real disposable income plus the reduction in total
government deficit.
5/ Real disposable income = (nominal full income - value of leisure)
- P where P is the price index from the demand system.
6/ Income classes by size of landholding.
1 - less than .5 hectare
2 - .5 to 1.0 ha
3 - 1.0 to 1.5 ha
4 - more than 1.5 ha
7/ Income classes by wage income.
1 lowest 21.4%
2 next 24.3%
3 next 24.3%
4 highest 30%
8/ ~Atkinson index = [ 1 NI8/ -Y i
i y
where Y is mean real income
Ni is fraction of population in class i.
Yi is real income of class i
For e = 0, the measure is average private real income; for c > 0,
an "inequality equivalent" real income, with increasing e
representing increasing inequality aversion.
9/ Government expenditure reductions are assumed to be redistributed on
a per capita basis.
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Chapter IV
Consequences of Alternative Model Specifications
IV.1 Introduction
Regardless of the particular version of the model analyzed, the overall
story told about the Korean agricultural economy remains qualitatively the
same. However, various choices the investigator has in designing the model
have interesting consequences for the actual numerical values in the
results. While the estimates of the supply and demand parameters are
estimated from econometric methods, some residual uncertainty surrounds their
use. Similarly, while every effort was made to capture the essential
institutional structures of the Korean rural economy, there can still be
differences of opinion concerning the assumptions of farmer behavior or
technological possibilities in agriculture. In this chapter, comparisons of
different formulations are made, and lessons concerning the effect of the
choices necessary made in setting up the model are drawn. For the Korean
context, this allows a more complete understanding of the way the model works
and allows for assessments of the effects of potential changes in it. For the
prospects of applying the model in other places, this chapter will point out
the substantive consequences of what may seem arbitrary or unimportant choices
of model building.
In general, the set of assumptions which underlie the Model "A" (fixed
labor supply, variable wages and estimated demand parameters), tend to
accentuate the effect of rural price reductions on the income and welfare of
the rural sector and make the deficit appear most resistant to reduction by
means of small policy changes. On the other hand, Model "B" (fixed wages,
elastic demand) tends to underplay the impact of policy on rural incomes and
makes deficit reduction a very simple matter. This indicates that the more
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substitutability that is built into the demand and supply structure, the more
quantities will change with the implied policy interventions (affecting self-
sufficiency and overall consumption and production levels) and the less will
real incomes change (both in nominal terms as in the rural sector and in cost
of living calculations in the urban sector). The following sections examine
variations in demand and supply parameters, rural labor market structure and
intrasectoral income distribution.
IV.2 Demand Parameters
Since survey data of reasonably high quality was available for Korea,
econometric estimation of a demand system was possible (see appendix C). In
the absence of such information, the structure of demand must be inferred in
indirect and imprecise ways. Even with statistical estimates, the parameters
used are subject to uncertainty, if only from sampling error of the
estimation procedure. Therefore, it is important to understand the
implications of a particular set of parameters and how much the results are
likely to differ with this choice.
In general, the less elastically the commodities in question are
demanded: a) the smaller will be the deficit reduction associated with a
given subsidy reduction to the rural sector b) the greater will be the offset
to rural real income reduction due to reductions in the urban cost of living,
c) the larger will be the deficit reduction due to urban price increases and
d) the larger will be the loss to urban consumers as a result of price
increases. Changing the assumptions concerning demand, then, increases the
attractiveness of each of these policies in some ways, and reduces it in
others.
Less elastic demand makes the deficit more stubborn in the face of rural
price changes since the government deficit is sensitive to the marketed
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surplus from the rural sector. If the total marketed surplus is very
sensitive to price, then a small reduction in price will reduce the amount
sold through government channels significantly. To achieve the same deficit
reduction in an inelastic demand regime, larger price reductions will be
necessary.
By the same token, the less elastic is the demand structure, the more a
given reduction in price will reduce the cost of living for the residents of
rural areas. Inelastic demands indicate that alternative goods are not
available or are not used to a great extent. Therefore price increases for
those goods are fully borne by the consumer. Conversely, when the price is
reduced, this comes as a relief to the consumer. For the analysis of the
effects of reducing the rural price of basic grains in Korea, the use of
inelastic demands implies the need for large decreases in price to relieve the
deficit (relative to a more elastic demand case) and larger decreases in the
nominal income of farmers. Countering this effect is the larger reduction in
the cost of living (in the rural sector and in the urban sector due to the
price reduction of traditional rice).
In the urban sector, in contrast, the more inelastic the demand for
grains, the easier it is to reduce the deficit with a given increase in
price. In rice, one offset to the deficit was the ability to earn tariff
revenue on imports. If demand, for rice is elastic, an increase in price
reduces demand, imports and tariff revenue substantially. If inelastic, the
gap between rural and urban prices can be closed without creating as much loss
in revenue. At the same time, however, this resistance of the quantity
demanded to price makes the goal of self-sufficiency harder to achieve through
price increases. Decreases in demand are reflected first in import
reduction. If demands do not respond very much to price, neither will imports
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or the self-sufficiency ratio. Similarly, if rural prices are decreased,
inelastic demand in the urban sector will mitigate the effect on
self-sufficiency. In general, inelastic demand makes self sufficiency less of
an issue. It is not sacrificed as much with rural price declines and it is
not promoted as much with urban price increases.
When the demand system is inelastic, the cost of living in the city is
increased more when the release price is raised. Therefore, the impact of
this policy on the calculation of real disposable income for the country as a
whole is exacerbated.
The effect of cross elasticities have been discussed above (Multi-market
interventions) and were seen to be of importance to the analysis of
"spillover" effects of policies aimed at one market on the deficit generated
in another market. Cross-elasticities are usually very hard to estimate
accurately in practice. For Korea, the intermarket effects were due to a
number of influences besides the cross price elasticity effect in the demand
system. The principal effect of cross price terms was to create a link
between the structure of urban demand and crop patterns in the rural sector.
With no cross price effects, the relative use of land between high yield and
traditional vice was independent of urban prices. With direct substitution
between the two rice, an increase in high yield prices in the urban sector
will increase overall demand for traditional rice and production will shift
toward traditional rice. Therefore, there is a secondary effect of this
policy on deficits in the rice markets: Reduced supply and marketed surplus
of high yield rice leads to further reduction in the rice deficit.
These comparisons have been made between two very different demand
systems. The system embodied in the "B" model assumes very elastic demand.
The own price elasticities for all foods is -1 and the direct cross price
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effects are zero. The "A" system, using estimated parameters, had implied own
price elasticities of -.3 for barley and -.5 for rice by people earning the
mean rural income. These are significantly different and give rise to the
very different outcomes outlined above. It is important, therefore, to have a
fairly good notion of the "true" behavior of the consumers. Fortunately,
while the results change significantly with the relatively large differences
between the two models, small variations around the parameters in version A do
not significantly change the results. Therefore, a reasonably good guess at
the actual elasticities is probably sufficient to get meaningful results.
IV.3 Supply Parameters
Two issues arise in the discussion of model specification on the supply
side. First, as with demand, the effect of changing the parameter estimates
used in the simulations may be explored. More importantly, the assumptions
concerning crop substitution possibilities and equilibrium allocations of land
should be subject to examination.
The production structure used in the presented versions of the model are
based on the Cobb-Douglas production structure and its related restricted
profit function. Econometric estimation was carried out for the more general
production structure based on the translog restricted profit function.
Results of this estimation are presented in Appendix C. While the formal test
of the Cobb-Douglas form was rejected, the actual parameter estimates derived
from that exercise were similar to the Cobb-Douglas specification derived from
aggregate production statistics. When the simulation was run using the
estimated values for production, very little was changed from the results
presented in version B. The only effect was to reduce the supply response to
a small degree. Given the much greater data requirements of the translog
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functional form, the Cobb-Douglas version is most likely to be useful in
further applications of the model.
The more important issue concerning the specification of production
involves the assumption of identical production functions for high yield
variety rice and traditional rice and its implications for equilibrium in the
rice markets and in land use.
Since there was no independent information concerning the production
structure of the two types of rice (production parameters were computed for
the aggregate commodity of total rice), the profit functions were assumed to
be identical except for a shift parameter for high yield which was chosen to
conform to known differences in yield between the two types of rice. In
conjunction with the assumption that land would be allocated between the two
strains of rice until their marginal value products were equal, this
assumption led to a linear production possibility frontier between the two
types and substantial substitution possibilities between them. If the two
types of rice have entirely different production functions, the substi-
tutability would be reduced. The consequences of relaxing the assumption of
identical production functions are relatively minor. Given that the two rices
are, in fact grown on the same kind of land in the same season, the formal
modelling of land allocation make sense. A production possibility frontier
between two such commodities will be approximately linear unless their
production processes are very different. 23/ Somewhat more fertilizer or less
labor in one or the other is not likely to make much difference. To the
extent that it does, however, the consequences of less substitution is to make
the supply response of high yield rice more inelastic (thereby reducing the
23/ See Harry Johnson, Aspects of the Theory of Tariffs.
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effectiveness of small rural price reductions in removing the deficit) but
will also make farm incomes somewhat less sensitive to the subsidy as well.
The reason for the latter point is that with less substitution possible, the
reduction in the subsidy rate will lead to smaller increases in the output of
traditional rice and therefore, smaller reductions in the price. The farmer
is protected from lost revenue in the other main crop. Again, the probable
impact on this change of assumption is small.
IV.4 Rural Labor Market
The most important ways in which the various models differ from one
another are not in differences in parameter values assumed within the model
structure but in the choice of model structure itself. The two most
significant aspects of the model in which alternative assumptions lead to very
different conclusions are in the market structure assumed to hold for rural
labor and in the detailed disaggregation of income classes in both the rural
and urban sectors.
The two polar assumptions made in the simulations are that wages in the
rural sector are fixed (version B) and that wages are flexible but the total
supply of labor in the rural sector is fixed (version A). In the latter case,
the wage will fall if the demand for labor is reduced due to lower grain
prices. In other words, we have assumed that rural labor supply is perfectly
elastic and perfectly inelastic respectively.
The difference between these two assumptions is most apparent in the
evaluation of the responsiveness of rural incomes to support price changes and
in the identification of gainers and losers in that case. When wages are
fixed, the effect on rural incomes is moderated greatly. The income of most
people is derived in large part from their own labor. If this labor retains
its value when support prices are reduced, total incomes will not change very
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much. This is especially true of "full" income which values leisure time at
its opportunity cost, or the wage rate. Thus, a 10 percent reduction of the
price of rice leads to a 2.5 percent fall in average rural incomes in the
fixed wage case but results in a 9.5 percent fall when wages are allowed to
vary.
Perhaps more interesting than the change in the average level of income
in the rural sector is the different distributional implications of the two
versions of the model. In the fixed wage case, the rural sector does not
uniformly suffer from a reduction in the farm subsidy. Landless workers and
the very small farmers (together making up about 30 percent of the rural
population) actually benefit from rural price reductions. The landless get no
benefit from the subsidy either directly (since they own no land) or
indirectly (through increased demand and, therefore, increased return for
their services). The higher prices for basic grains merely increases their
cost of living. Indeed, they seem to be the biggest gainers from a cut in the
subsidy. Small farmers, who are also net purchasers of grain, also get a
benefit from a price fall though smaller than that for the landless since they
purchase a smaller percentage of their consumption of grains. In the fixed
wage case there is a conflict of interests between the small and large
farmers.
In the flexible wage case, these differences between residents in the
rural area disappear. One consequence of a grain price reduction in this case
is a lessened demand for labor. This translates into a lower wage which
affect all workers in farming, not just the landowners. A flexible wage
brings about a unification of interests, through the labor market mechanism,
the costs of the lower support price are shared by the whole sector.
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Which of these assumptions is true is difficult to determine. In the
very short run (when grains have already been planted say) the fixed wage case
is most relevant. If there are many employment opportunities in the rural
sector outside of rice and barley production which may have very elastic
demand for labor, this would also lend support for a fixed wage. However, for
a planning period of a crop season (when plans for hiring or allocating labor
can be altered) and, as is the case, rice and barley are the main rural
activities, there will be some wage adjustment. It will probably not be as
severe as version A suggests, however, as there is likely to be at least some
elasticity of supply of labor, even in the short run. In the long run (which
this model is not completely equipped to analyze) the wage responsiveness of
labor is probably fairly high as the reduced wages induce migration to the
urban areas. In this case, as mentioned above, the fixed wage case is
probably closest to the truth and the induced migration is given by the total
reduction in demand for labor.
A secondary effect of allowing for rural wage determination is that the
implied supply elasticities are reduced. If wages fall due to decreased labor
demand, per unit costs of production of grain fall as well. This provides a
partial, though necessarily incomplete, offset to the reduced profits of
farming and moderates the fall in production.
IV.5 Intrasectoral Income Distributions
The second main aspect of the model which would change the results under
alternative formulations is the treatment of the intrasectoral income
distribution.
Few of the descriptive results change with the disaggregated modelling of
the income distribution. That is, total supply response is
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unchanged and the change in demand elasticities is negligible. What does
change is the normative assessment of alternative policies.
One standard approach taken in project evaluation is to aggregate the
rural sector into one group and the urban sector into another. In Korea, the
rural sector would be the poorer sector on average. Therefore, all evaluation
based on increasing the governments concern for the poor would give a premium
to any policy favoring the rural sector. As discussed above, when the income
distribution is characterized in more detail, it becomes clear that the very
poorest segment of the population are urban dwellers. This apparent
contradiction is resolved by noting that the urban sector distribution of
income is far more inequitable than iS the rural. Further, in our definition
of classes, this groups is 15 percent of the population as opposed to 28
percent in the entire rural sector and is, therefore, a substantial counter
argument to the simpler characterization. Therefore, there is no simple way
to summarize the effect of concern for income distribution on evaluation of
policy. It is still true that the rural sector is generally poorer than the
urban but concern for the very poor might lead to an urban bias in choosing
policies. Therefore, it is important for the policy maker to be explicit as
to what aspects of the income distribution are most in need of improvement,
its overall shape (leading to favoring rural areas) or its lower tail.
Within the rural sector the disaggregation into smaller classes also
changes the interpretation of some of the results. As discussed in the
previous section, when the rural wage is fixed, there is disagreement as to
the attractiveness of reducing rural prices within the rural sector itself.
While the sector as a whole is damaged by the subsidy reduction, the poorer
groups within the sector are the greatest beneficiaries of the subsidy
reduction since they are net consumers of the now cheaper grain. By
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identifying the interests of the sector, as a whole, with those of the poor we
run the risk of ignoring the poor in the rural sector.
The net result of aggregation into rural and urban sectors and treating
them as different income groups leads to the result of giving preference to
the 16th to 43rd percentile groups in the population when the rural poor share
the average rural income change or the 23rd to 43rd percentile groups when
they do not. It is not clear what ethical system would lead to this pattern
of preferences.
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Chapter V
Conclusion
The Government of Korea must decide the relative important of its various
agricultural policy goals such as self-sufficiency and maintenance of farm
incomes. It must also decide what costs are acceptable in attempting to
achieve these goals, costs which will arise in the form of changes in
government deficits, of adjustments in the urban cost of living, and of shifts
in the income of the very poor, who are urban residents. Agricultural policy,
especially pricing policy, may well advance one of these objectives but incur
costs which are too high or which have offsetting negative effects on other
agricultural policy goals.
The conclusions emerging from our analysis are classified into three
categories: (a) detailed pricing policy conclusions, (b) methodological
conclusions, and (c) overall agricultural policy conclusions.
V. 1 Pricing Policy Conclusions
(a) Rice. The rice market best illustrates the conflict between the various
goals of government policy. The consequences of rice pricing policies which
are on the immediate agenda are exemplified by the following:
(i) For a 10% reduction in the rural prices of high yield rice
- the combined GMF and FF deficit will decline by 32%
- national income will increase by .13%
- average rural incomes will decline by 5.5%
- the proportion of rice consumption met by local production
will fall from 93% to 88%
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(ii) For a 10% increase in the urban price of high yield rice
- the combined GMF and FF deficits will decline by 20%
- national income will decline by .44%
- average urban incomes will decline by .65%
- the proportion of rice consumption met by local production
will increase from 93% to 94%
(iii) In general, the deficit is more sensitive to changes in rural than in
urban prices
(iv) If the government is constrained to the use of rice prices, the goals
of self sufficiency and rural income conflict directly with national
income and the cost of living. The order of magnitudes are provided
above and in greater detail in the text.
(b) Barley. National consumption of barley is unlikely to be increased by
pricing policies alone. Current policies encourage severe overproduction
leading to large inventories which are wasted. The impact of lowered support
prices on ipcome is modest (though certain regions may be disproportionately
affected). If consumption for nutritional reasons is the goal, reliance on
cheap imports is a more effective means.
(c) Fertilizer. Current fertilizer prices serve as a direct tax on the
farmer. The ability to obtain low-cost fertilizer from world markets or from
a domestic industry which is competitive with those markets would increase
farm income by a half percent. In addition, substantial deficit costs could
be saved. If price reductions for rural crops are implemented, fertilizer
price reductions could offset some of the added burden on the farmer.
(d) Policy Coordination. Price policies for rice and barley must be
considered simultaneously. Due to substitution possibilities in supply and
demand, intervention in one commodity market has important consequences for
- 78 -
the other. If one rural price is to be lowered, the other should be lowered
as well in order to limit the increase in its marketed surplus. Urban prices
may be treated more independently because the spillover effects are of a
complementary nature.
V.42 Methodological Considerations
The method of analysis used in this report raises two issues.
a) Multi-Market Analysis
Substitution possibilities in both production and consumption are
frequently overlooked in standard analyses. These are of central importance
to the results reported here. For producers, the ability to substitute
traditional rice for high yield variety rice leads to considerably higher
supply elasticities for the subsidized commodity than would emerge from an
analysis of the aggregate commodity "rice". This has profound effects on the
calculation of deficit reductions due to price changes. It also helps to
identify indirect effects of policies, such as the reduced cost of traditional
rice in urban areas when the rural high yield price declines.
On the demand side, the spillover effects of related markets are
substantial. When rural rice prices are reduced, for example, barley sales to
the government increase, partially offsetting the savings in the deficits.
Consideration of such multi-market effects leads to substantive policy
implications, such as the need to coordinate price changes in related
commodities. Such effects require a general approach to modelling the rural
sector.
b) Sensitivity of Results
In any numerical exercise of this kind, some concern always surrounds the
reliability or the robustness of the results. Exact predictions of the
effects of possible policies require exact knowledge of the values of the
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underlying parameters. This knowledge does not generally exist. Some
parameters, such as cross price elasticities, are notably difficult to
identify with precision. Encouraging for this report is the fact that the
essential story of the price policy effects is unchanged in various
alternative formulations and parameter values. The qualitative effects of
policies are resistant to reasonable changes in parameter values. The
quantitative effects vary, of course, but within bounds narrow enough to be
useful.
V. 3 Agricultural Policy and the Goals of Government
Each of the goals mentioned above is of genuine value for Korean
society. The difficulty, and the need to evaluate tradeoffs, arises from the
fact that all of these goals cannot be satisfied by changes in agricultural
prices alone. Too many different effects are expected from the application of
these limited tools. Instead, priority should be given to expanding the
number of policy instruments available in order to allow the government to
satisfy more of its objectives simultaneously.
One important purpose of the GMF was to improve the standard of living in
the rural sector in order to moderate the rapid migration into already
congested urban areas. If it is migration which is the problem, then
solutions should be found which attack it directly. Off farm employment
possibilities, decentralization of industry, urban amenities and planning,
rural social services and agricultural extension might be encouraged rather
than putting undue emphasis on agricultural pricing policies.
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Data Sources
1. Korea, Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery, Report on the Results of
Farm Household Economy Survey, various years.
2. Korea, Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery, Agricultural Policy
Handbook, 1982.
3. Korea, Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery, Yearbook of Agriculture
and Forestry Statistics, various years.
4. Korea, Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery, Report on the Results of
Production Cost Survey of Agricultural Products, various years.
5. Korea, Economic Planning Board, Annual Report on the Family Income
and Expenditure Survey, various years.
6. Korea, Ministry of Finance, Public Finance and Banking Statistics,
various years.
7. Korea, National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, Report of Rice
Marketing Survey in Korea, 1978.
8. Korea, Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery, Unpublished Data on Grain
Marketing, Prices and Fertilizer Production and Prices.
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APPENDIX A
A Background Note on the Grain Management Fund (GMF)
and Fertilizer Fund (FF) in Korea
Since the early 1960's the Grain Management Fund (GMF) and Fertilizer
Fund (FF) have been the central elements of a system of dual agricultural
pricing in Korea. The two marketing boards have had a substantial impact on
the market for food grains and fertilizers, and have incurred a significant
proportion of the total government deficit. This note discusses essential
features of the public pricing and distribution system, particularly for rice,
barley, and fertilizer, and touches upon related institutional aspects which
are relevant to the model.
I. Grain Management Fund (GMF)
I.1. Economic Importance of Rice and Barley.
Rice and barley have traditionally been the most important crops in
the Korean agricultural economy. In 1981, rice accounted for 52 percent of
agricultural receipts, and about 8 percent of GNP.l/ The relative share of
I/ For the relative composition by crop of agricultural gross receipts, see
Report on the Results of Farm Household Economic Survey, MAF, 1982, p. 62.
According to the report, average gross receipts from rice per household
amounted to 1,697,088 won in 1981. Multiplying the average receipts from rice
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barley has declined in recent years, from about 10 to about 4 percent of
agricultural gross receipts.
Consumer expenditure on rice is substantial as well. Expenditure on rice
was 12 percent of total urban household expenditure in 1979, and 19 percent of
total farm household expenditure in 1981.2/ In these years, expenditure on
barley was .3 percent of urban and 2 percent of rural household expenditure,
respectively.
I.2. Operations and Objectives of GMF
Since the enactment of the Grain Management Fund Law in 1950, the markets
for rice and barley have been subject to substantial government inter-
vention.3/ The government has had the following primary objectives: a) to
provide adequate production incentives for farmers, in order to obtain
self-sufficiency in the major grains, and to raise farm incomes; b) to hold
down consumer prices in urban areas; and c) to stabilize the prices of rice
and barley, especially in the immediate post and pre-harvest seasons.
The government authority extends to complete price and quantity regulation
of the domestic and import/export grain markets; and also to directly procure,
transport, store, mill, and sell government controlled grains. In practice
the grain markets operate as a dual system of free and government controlled
markets, with varying degrees of intervention from year to year (Table 1).
by the total number of farm households, 2,030,000 gives us national gross
receipts from rice to derive the percentage contribution to GNP.
2/ Computed from Annual Report on the Family Income and Expenditure Survey,
Economic Planning Board, 1978, and "Report on the Results of Farm Household
Economy Survey," MAF, 1982.
3/ For the historical development of both rice price and government
intervention, see Moon, Pal Yong, "The Evolution of Rice Policy in Korea,"
Food Research Institute Studies, Vol. XIV, No. 4, 1975, Stanford University.
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Table 1: Quantities of Domestic Production and Government
Purchasing of Rice and Barley
(Unit - 1,000 Seok)
Rice (Polished) Barley (Polished)
Year Production Gov't. Purchase B/A Production Gov't. Purchase B/A
(A) (B) (A) (B) (Z)
1965 24,313 2,097 8.6 10,575 552 5.2
1968 22,189 919 4.1 12,171 817 6.7
1970 27,356 2,436 8.9 11,528 1,294 11.2
1973 29,248 3,331 11.4 10.461 2,669 25.5
1975 32,429 5,483 16.9 10,062 2,994 29.8
1976 36,215 7,245 20.0 12,780 4,138 32.4
1977 41,706 9,742 23.4 5,896 1,372 23.3
1978 40,258 9,413 23.4 9,768 3,504 35.9
1979 38,645 9,032 23.4 10,929 4,056 37.1
1980 24,655 3,790 15.4 5,876 2,996 51.0
1981 35,160 6,167 17.5 6,221 2,948 47.4
Note: Polished Rice 1 Seok - 144 kg
Polished Barley 1 Seok - 138 kg
Source: Agricultural Policy handbook, HAF, 1982, p. 204.
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I.3. Total GMF Deficit
The GMF deficit has been a substantial proportion of total government
expenditures, from .3 percent to 10 percent over the years 1970-1981
(Table 2). Management of the deficit has become a major component of money
sLipply management, since this deficit has been directly financed through loans
from Bank of Korea.
The deficit ls incurred as follows: the government purchases substantial
stocks of grain in the harvest season, to support the producer price, and
releases stocks at a lower price in the off-harvest season. The wedge between
purchase and release price became substantial in the early 70's (Table 3).
Note that both the purchase and release prices are well above the world price
for rice; the purchase price has in fact been more than double the world price
in recent years. Handling costs are a substantial proportion of the
deficit. In 1980 the handling cost per bag of rice was 60 percent of the
direct loss per bag. Handling costs and direct loss per bag of barley are
even higher than for rice.
II. Historical Overview of Food Grains
II.1. Production of Rice and Barley
Table 4 presents a summary of the production history of rice and barley
in recent years. Rice production increased steadily from 1970 until 1977,
when Korea produced a record crop of about one and one-half times the 1970
harvest. The introduction of high yielding varieties (HYV) of rice, increased
application of fertilizers; a steady development of the rural infrastructure
contributed to an increase in productivity, and the area sown increased
slightly. After 1977, Korea experienced a modest decline in rice production
for two years, followed by a drastic decrease in 1980, a year which witnessed
bad weather and disease.
Table 2: Grain Management Fund Deficit by Crop
(Unit = 100 Million Won)
Central Gov-t GNP (E)
Expenditure (Current Prices:
Year Rice A/C Barley B/C Misc. Wheat Total & Net Loan one billion won)
(A) (%) (B) (%) Grains Subsidy (C) (D) C/D C/E
(Z) (%)
1970 4 - 28 - 4 - 28 - 2,684
1971 51 - 45 - 6 5,485 0 3,295
1972 49 - 61 - 4 6 - 22 7,462 4,029 0.30
1973 9 - 88 - 10 - 165 - 254 7,212 5,238 3.52 0.485
1974 - 327 26.2 - 356 28.5 - 19 - 548 - 1,250 12,030 7,333 10.39 1.705
1975 - 163 17.4 - 220 23.5 - 7 - 546 - 936 17,653 9,793 5.30 0.956
1976 - 197 39.1 - 286 56.9 - 5 - 15 - 503 25,189 13,273 2.00 0.379
1977 - 219 34.7 - 433 68.6 21 0 - 631 32,744 17,021 1.93 0.371
1978 -1,540 96.8 - 145 9.1 94 0 - 1,591 44,080 22,918 3.61 0.694
1979 -1,851 88.7 - 285 13.7 49 0 - 2,087 59,990 29,072 3.48 0.718
1980 -1,400 57.9 -1,068 44.2 51 0 - 2,417 76,820 34,322 3.15 0.704
1981 - 218 15.1 -1,268 88.0 45 0 - 1,441 - 42,397 - 0.340
Total -5,802 52.0 -4,283 38.4 205 -1,280 -11,160 -
Note: Negative numbers indicate loss in the Government Grain Management operations.
Source: Food Bureau, MAF, 1982.
Government Expenditure data are from Public Finance and Banking Statistics, Ministry of Finance,
November, 1981.
Table 3: Grain Management Fund Deficit by Rice and Barley per Bag
(Unit : Won)
Rice (Polished 80 kg = one bag) Barley (Polished 76.5 kg = one bag)
Cost Revenue Deficit Cost Revenue Deficit
Rice Purchase Handling Import. Release Purchase Handling Release
Year Price Cost Price Price Price Cost Price
(a) (b) (c) (c)-(A+B) (a) (b) (c) (c)-(A+B)
70 5,150 578 4,788 5,400 - 328 3,348 439 2,750 - 1,037
71 7,000 664 4,449 6,500 - 1,164 3,580 548 3,100 - 1,298
72 8,750 738 4,372 9,500 12 4,890 572 4,300 - 1,262
73 9,888 792 7,982 9,500 - 1,180 6,357 796 4,800 - 2,353
74 11,377 915 16,495 11,264 - 1,028 6,993 909 6,000 - 1,902 x
75 15,760 1,488 15,643 13,000 - 4,248 9,091 1,412 6,900 - 3,603
76 19,000 1,996 10,183 16,730 - 4,766 11,100 1,446 8,320 - 4,226
77 23,200 2,424 8,480 19,500 - 6,124 13,000 1,749 9,200 - 5,549
78 26,000 3,372 no import 22,420 - 7,212 15,500 2,462 10,120 - 7,842
79 30,000 5,088 11,113 26,500 - 8,588 18,500 4,062 10,120 -12,448
80 36,600 7,126 21,645 32,000 -11,960 22,000 9,618 10,120 -21,498
81 47,750 9,750 N.A. 44,000 -11,500 26,400 12,546 17,595 -21,351
82 52,100 10,184 N.A. 53,280 - 9,064 29,700 13,691 19,355 -24,036
Note: Rice year begins November 1 of previous year and ends October 31, current year. (Rice deficit
calculations exclude tariff revenues).
Source: Agricultural policy handbook, MAF, 1982, p. 206.
Import prices in US Dollar are from Kym Anderson "South Korean Agricultural Price and Trade
Policies: Their Effects since 1965" Working Paper, KREI, March 1981.
The price series in dollars are converted into Won using annual exchange rate.
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In contrast, the planted area for barley decreased by about 57 percent
over the decade, falling sharply in the later years. Barley production
declined by half during the period due to the reduction in the relative
profitablity of barley, as well as decreased per capita consumption.
For all other field crops but vegetables, planted area decreased over the
decade (Table 5). These crops maintained nearly constant yeilds per acre, in
contrast with rice and barley, leading to a decline in their relative
profitability. However, the area sown to vegetables increased substantially
in the late 1970's, as the demand for vegetables increased. The demand,
though, seems to be saturated and the increased supplies of last year led to
significant reductions in prices and profitability. The production of
livestock also increased substantially during the 70's.
II.2. Consumption of Rice and Barley
The 70's have seen significant changes in food consumption patterns in
Korea. Grain consumption per capita has declined slightly since 1970, and
that of vegetables, meats and fruits has substantially increased (Table 3).
Per capita consumption of rice,the most important cereal in the Korean
diet, has been more or less steady over the decade, with a slight drop in the
middle years. (Transmitting changes in rice consumption per capita may be
done more to supply constraints rather than income effects.) Average
consumption was about 130 kg per capita.
Barley consumption has dropped sharply, especially from 1977. Over the
decade, per capita barley consumption decreased by 63 percent, from 37 kg in
1970 to 14 kg in 1980.
Two factors account for the fall in barley consumption: rising incomes,
as barley has traditionally been an inferior good; and the removal of
government regulations imposed to encourage barley consumption in the early
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Table 4: Production and Planted Area for Rice and Barley
Rice Barley
Production Planted Yield Prodn Planted yield
Area Area
(1,000 M/T) (1000 ha) kg/hd (1000 M/T) (1000 ha) kg/ha
1965 3,501 1,228 2,851 1,657 933 1,776
1970 3,939 1,203 3,274 1,820 833 2,185
1971 3,998 1,190 3,360 1,715 768 2,233
1972 3,957 1,191 3,322 1,756 777 2,260
1973 4,212 1,181 3,566 1,549 713 2,173
1974 4,445 1,204 3,692 1,468 745 1,970
1975 4,669 1,218 3,833 1,806 760 2,376
1976 5,215 1,215 4,292 1,847 752 2,456
1977 6,006 1,230 4,883 862 545 1,582
1978 5,797 1,229 4,717 1,388 575 2,414
1979 5,565 1,233 4,513 1,556 489 3,182
1980 3,550 1,233 2,879 906 360 2,517
1981 5,063 858
Source: Yearbook of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics, MAF, 1981 p. 62 and
p.66. Yields are computed from production and planted area.
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Table 5: Planted Area of other Crops, Vegetables and Fruits
(Unit: 1,000 ha)
Year Miscell Pulses Potatoes Vegetables Special Total Land*
Grains Crops Utilized
1971 99.6 337.8 163.3 257.1 90.6 3,100.3
1972 85.5 340.1 147.4 247.9 81.7 3,076,1
1973 91.6 369.7 138.2 254.2 83.3 3,048.9
1974 72.8 333.4 121.5 274.1 107.0 3,096.5
1975 73.4 332.7 146.3 243.5 108.9 3,143.6
1976 66.6 312.4 136.1 281.4 123.6 3,173.6
1977 64.9 326.5 127.3 293.9 121.6 3,033.2
1978 54.9 313.8 112.6 275.7 121.7 3,001.1
1979 49.3 276.8 94.8 338.7 118.9 2,908.6
1980 52.7 255.5 92.4 359.3 105.8 2,765.2
* Total land utilized includes double cropped and means national total area
devoted entire agricultural field crops.
Source: Yearbook of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics, MAF, 1981, p. 32.
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Table 6: Trend of Per Capita Yearly Food Consumption
(Unit: kg)
Year Rice Barley Wheat Vegetables Meats Fruits Per Capita
GNP
(current US$)
1965 121.8 36.8 13.8 46.7 4.6 9.8 105
1970 136.4 37.3 26.1 59.9 6.6 10.0 243
1975 123.6 36.3 29.5 62.5 6.5 14.0 574
1976 120.1 34.7 30.2 68.2 6.9 13.1 765
1977 126.4 28.5 30.3 62.5 7.8 15.3 965
1978 134.7 18.1 30.5 104.0 10.1 16.2 1,279
1979 135.6 14.1 30.6 122.5 11.4 16.4 1,597
1980 132.4 13.8 29.4 120.6 11.3 16.2 1,481
70/80 97.1 37.0 112.6 201.3 171.2 162.0
Note: Meats include beef, pork and chicken.
Source: "A Study on the Demand Supply for Food," Research Report #32, Korea
Rural Economic Institute, December 1981, p. 5.
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years of the decade. Restaurants had been required to serve a mixture of
three-quarters rice, one quarter barley; to serve riceless dishes twice
weekly, and to use a smaller, standard sized bowl. The government prohibited
making alcohol from rice. In 1977, in the face of a record rice crop, most of
these restrictions were removed. Per capita barley consumption dropped in the
next year by 36 percent, and rice consumption increased by 6 percent.
As per capita income grows, barley consumption is likely to decline even
further. On the other hand, demand for barley as animal feed and in beer
production is expected to increase.
II.3. Imports of Rice and Barley
Grain imports between 1956 and 1964 were carried out under U.S. Public Law
480, after Korea signed the U.S. Farm Surplus Importation Agreement in
1955.4/ Farm products imported under the agreement, which allowed virtually
free imports, include wheat, barley, and other commodities, but exclude
rice. Wheat and barley accounted for roughly 50 to 60 percent of the annual
value of these imports. During this period, Korea imported about 13 percent
of total domestic production, and of this, some 84 percent were grain imports
under US PL480. Although the import of free grain on this scale helped to
ease foreign exchange constraints, there is still disagreement among
researchers about the effect of PL 480 on Korea's long term agricultural
development.
Table 7 displays production, consumption, and import statistics for rice
and barley from 1965. Other sources of demand are animal feed, waste, and
4/ For an historical perspective on grain imports and rice policy in Korea,
see Moon, Pal Yong "The Evolution of Rice Policy in Korea," Food Research
Institute Studies, Vol. XIV, No. 4, 1975, Stanford University.
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Table 7: Production, Human Consumption, and Imports of Rice and Barley
(Unit : 1,000 M/T)
Rice Barley
Year Prodn Human Import Prodn Human Imports
Consump Consump
1965 3,501 3,496 - 1,657 1,056 7
1970 3,939 4,275 541 1,820 1,169 -
1971 3,998 4,433 907 1,715 1,210 -
1972 3,957 4,506 584 1,756 1,256 254
1973 4,212 4,413 437 1,549 1,340 350
1974 4,945 4,434 206 1,468 1,384 299
1975 4,669 4,361 481 1,806 1,281 354
1976 5,215 4,307 157 1,847 1,244 -
1977 6,006 4,606 - 862 1,038 330
1978 5,797 4,986 - 1,388 670 -
1979 5,565 5,099 502 1,556 530 -
1980 3,550 5,048 580 906 526 -
1981 5,063 - - - - -
Note: 1) Measured in polished grains
2) Human Consumption figures are obtained by per capita consumption
multiplical by the total number of population.
Sources: Yearbook of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics, MAF, 1981, p. 62.
Handbook of Agricultural Policy, MAF, 1982, pp. 30, 193 and 200.
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government inventory, vhich are not shown. Substantial shortfall in
production has resulted in imports for both rice and barley; in 1971, for
example, rice imports accounted for 20 percent of domestic consumption.
Barley imports were substantial during the mid-70's, although there have been
no imports since 1978. Imports of rice and barley are handled directly by
the government, whereas the imports of wheat and other grains are handled
partially by private importers.
III. The Rice Market
III.1. Production of Rice by Variety
Table 8 presents the production history of rice, broken down by high
yield and traditional varieties. The high-yield variety of rice, TongiLt/,
was introduced on a large scale in 1974. At the peak of its success in 1977,
average productivity had risen by 46 percent over 1971; Tongil yeilds were 1.3
times those of traditional varieties.
Acreage sown to HYV increased rapidly in 1978. Currently, the choice of
variety to plant rests entirely with the farmer, but in the early years of the
decade he was encouraged by several government policies. An educational
campaign was carried out through the Office of Rural Development, which
explained the new production techniques and encouraged use of the new
varieties. Easy access to subsidized agricultural credit was provided to
those farmers who planted HYV rice. However, the most important instrument to
influence farmers' choice of rice variety was the government price support for
HYV. Government procured large amounts of HYV, and from the mid-70's the
5/ Tongil is a cross-breed of the Indica and Japonica rice which requires
more intensive application of chemical fertilizers than do traditional
varieties. It matures early and has shorter shares than traditional rice
strains, as well as a high yield potential.
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Table 8: Area Planted and Yields by Rice Variety
Year Area Planted (1,000 ha) Yield (kg/ha)
H.Y.V. T.V.1/ Total H.Y.V. T.V. Average A/B
1971 3( 0.3) 1,175(99.7) 1,178 5,010 3,370 3,370 148.7
1974 181(15.2) 1,008(84.8) 1,189 4,730 3,530 3,710 134.0
1975 274(22.9) 924(77.1) 1,198 5,030 3,510 3,860 143.3
1976 533(44.6) 663(55.4) 1,196 4,790 3,960 4,330 121.0
1977 660(54.6) 548(45.4) 1,208 5,530 4,230 4,940 130.7
1978 929(76.2) 290(23.80 1,219 4,860 4,350 4,740 111.7
1979 744(60.7) 480(39.3) 1,224 4,630 4,370 4,530 105.9
1980 604(49.5) 616(50.5) 1,220 2,870 2,920 2,890 107.1
Note: 1/ Traditional Variety
2/ The members in the parenthesis indicate relative percentage.
Source: Yearbook of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics, MAF, various years.
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amount of traditional rice purchased by the Government was negligable (see
Annex Table 4). Incentives were concentrated in those regions most suited to
the new high yield varieties. From its peak in 1978, when three quarters of
acreage sown was to HYV, HYV production has declined sharply. Two factors
account for this: the high risk of HYV; and increasing yields of traditional
rice. Traditional variety rice has shown a strong increase in productivity
over the decade; yield ratios of the two varieties have dropped from 1.5 at
the beginning of the decade to nearly one. As the free market price of
traditional rice is higher than that of HYV, traditional rice has become
relatively more profitable.
1980 was a disastrous year for the rice crop in Korea, and highlights the
increased risk of HYV rice. Unusually cold weather during the growing season
encouraged the spread of disease to which Tongil rice is quite susceptible.
Average yields fell to the lowest in the decade, and HYV yield was below that
of traditional rice.
III.2. Marketing Rice
As the Government procures and markets only part of the rice crop each
year, there are broadly two channels by which rice is marketed in Korea: an
unregulated free market, and the government channel. There are also broadly
two products in each market: traditional variety rice, which is much
preferred by the Korean consumer, and commands a premium in the free market;
and HYV rice.
Table 4 in the Annex gives government purchase quantities of rice by
variety; Table 9 gathers together production, consumption, and marketing
statistics for several years. Two features stand out from this data: the
government has purchased virtually only HYV rice for several years, although
it purchased slightly more traditional rice in 1981. Total government
Table-9: PRODUCTION, MARKETED SURPLUS, GOVERNMENT TRANSACTION OF RICE IN
KOREA
Rice Total Quantity of Quantity of Marketed Quantity Quantity Quantity Consumed
Year Production 1/ T.V. HYV Surplus Purchased Released by Non-Farm
Produced 1/ Produced 1/ 2/ of aggregated by Gov't. by Gov't. Household
Rice 2/
1965 24,313 N.A. N.A. N.N. 2,097 652 11,271
1970 27,356 N.A. N.A. 12,198 2,436 5,199 18,148
1975 32,134 22,553 9,581 (29.8) 15,612 5,483 3,838 18,262
1976 35,969 18,236 17,733 (49.3) 17,438 (54.3) 7,245 5,890 18,421
1977 41,425 16,091 25,334 (61.2) 20,081 (55.8) 9,742 4,210 20,260
1978 40,133 8,770 31,363 (78.1) 22,506 (54.3) 9,413 8,215 22,726 1
1979 38,515 14,567 23,948 (62.2) 21,889 (54.5) 9,032 11,686 23,859 x
1980 24,511 12,477 12,034 (49.1) N.A. 3,790 12,099 23,787
1981 34,997 25,251 9,746 (27.8) N.A. 6,167 10,832 25,094
N.A. Neither available nor exist.
Note:
1/ Figures related to production are measured in Calendar Year but the rest of figure are in rice year.
Tice here includes only paddy rice, excluding upland rice which is about 3 to 5 percent of total rice
production.
2/ The numbers in the parentheses with the quantity of H.Y.V. produced are percentage of corresponding
year's total production but those with marketed surplus of aggregated rice are percentage of previous
year's total production.
Source: - Production figures from Ag. Policy Handbook, MAF 1982, p. 126.
- The rest of data up to 1979 from "A Study of Rice-Marketing (in Korea)" Joo Yong Jae,
et. al., Korea Rural Economics Institute, Research Report No. 21, 1980, December p. 96-97.
- The data for 1980, 1981 from AgriculturaL Policy Handbook 1982 and by derivations.
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purchases have been much less than those required to satisfy urban consumer
demand, indicating that substantial quantities of both HYV and traditional
rice flow through private markets.
Precise data on the kinds of rice that flow through private markets is
unavailable, but quantities are inferred as follows: Based upon a rice
marketing survey conducted in 1978 by the National Agricultural Cooperative
Federation, we assume that the average urban household consumes 70 percent of
HYV and 30 percent traditional rice.6/ Consumption figures may then be
calculated from aggregate rice statistics (Table 10). Urban demand is met
partly by government rice, for which detailed statistics exist; any excess
demand is assumed to be met through private markets. Using these figures for
1979, 31 percent of HYV rice consumed by urban households was supplied through
the private market (Table 11).
We assume for simplicity of modeling, however, that HYV rice is handled
only through government channels. This assumption is more applicable to
current years since the rapid drop in production quantities of HYV rice in
recent years (by roughly a factor of 2 from 1979 to 1980) makes it unlikely
that there was a large active private market in HYV rice in 1980 and 1981.
This is supported by the evidence of purchases of traditional variety rice by
the GMF in 1981.
The government releases its rice at a uniform price throughout the year,
with the objective of stabilizing consumer prices. Annex Table 12 gives the
monthly price profile of free market rice. There is a variation of
approximately 20 percent over the year; generally the peak price occurs in the
6/ Corresponding figures for rural households are 84 percent HYV and 16
percent traditional.
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Table 10: Flow of Rice Among Sectors in Rice Year 1979
(Unit : polished 1000 M/T)
Farm Households Non-Farm Households
o Supply - 6,270 o Consumption 3,438
Year-First Inventory = 473 Foodgrains 3,277
Current Production 5,797 Processing 161
o Consumption - 3,326 o Purchasing = 3,438
Foodgrains 1,880 1,374 Gov't channel 2,129
Seeds 35 Free Market 1,309
Loss 416
Others 996 o Year-End Inventory = 0.0
2,129
o Sales 2,729
To Gov't = 1,355
To Free Market = 1,374
o Year-End Inventory - 281
Government
o Supply = 2,601
Year-First Inventory = 744
Purchase 1,356
1,355 Import = 501
o Release - 2,129
o Year-End Inventory -471
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Table 11A PRODUCTION AND URBAN-RURAL CONSUMPTION OF RICE BY VARIETY IN
RICE YEAR 1979
(Unit - 1,000 M/T)
Production
Total 1/ Traditional High Yielding
Variety Variety
(T.V.) (H.Y.V..>
5,799 1,263 4,516
Consumption
Urban Households Z/
Total: 3,436 2/ T.V.: 996 4/ H.Y.V.: 2,440 4/
Gov't. channel: 1,683 3/ Gov't. channel: 0.0 Gov't. channel: 1,683
Free Market: 1,753 Free Market: 996 Free Market: 757
Rural Households
Total: 1,631 5/ T.V.: 267 6/ H.Y.V.: 1,364 6/
7v'tT. channel: 0.0 Gov't channel: 0.0 Gov't. channel: 0.0
Free Market: 0.0 Free Market: 0.0 Free Market: 0.0
Note:
1/ Production Figures refer to rice harvested in October through November 1978 and are from
Agrtcultural Policy Handbook, MAF 1982 p. 126.
2/ Urban households here refer to non-farm households, and hence are a slight over estimate of
real number of urban households. Consumption figures were obtained by per capita yearly
consumption multiplied by the number of non-farm people.
3/ In rice year 1979, the government purchased HYV only. We assume that the rice released by
the government was bought entirely by urban households.
4/ The differentials between total quantity consumed by urban households and quantity released
by the government is assumed to be supplied through free market channels. Further, we
assume that the ration of H.Y.V. and T.V. is 71 to 29 percent respectively based on the
survey conducted by the NationaL AgricuLtural Cooperatives Federation (NACY). See "The
Report of Rice Marketing Survey (in Korea): NACF, 1978 Septenver p. 356.
5/ Rural households are assumed to consume retained rice from total produce netting out
marketed surplus. Total consumption figures are obtained per capita yearly consumption of
149.9 Kg. multiplied by total number of rural people 10,884 thousand persons in rice year
1979.
6/ We assume that all retained T.V. rice was consumed by rural households and the rest fitted
by H.Y.V.
Last point in the above table, inventories carried-in and out are ignored. Obviously, the
difference between total production of 5,799 and total consumption of 5,067
(- 3,436 + 1,631) would be the inventory carried-over to 1980.
Table 12: Monthly Prices of HYV and Traditional Rice in Free Market in 1978-1982
Price Year Month
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC Average Release
Price
Wholesale 1978 23,947 24,031 23,119 22,947 23,004 24,002 25,093 25,149 25,131 25,656 26,948 27,467 24,709 26,500
Price 1979 26,667 30,358 31,213 31,624 32,675 32,818 33,463 34,219 34,227 34,425 34,398 34,959 32,671 32,000
HYV (average 1980 35,835 37,550 36,891 36,607 36,669 36,767 37,202 37,381 39,631 45,670 45,653 48,756 34,551 44,000
over 16 1981 48,937 48,885 49,032 49,422 50,833 55,593 57,447 58,357 56,644 52,993 50,848 50,296 52.444 44,000
clties) 1982 49,958 50,354 50,400 50,400 50,400
Purchase
Price
Farm Gate 1978 23,329 23,336 22,425 22,428 22,556 23,542 24,729 24,499 24,420 24,848 25,737 26,945 24,016 30,000
Price 1979 27,061 29,428 30,384 30,802 32,664 32,367 32,775 33,280 33,438 33,500 33,337 33,910 31,912 36,600 -
Rice (average over 1980 34,713 36,484 35,725 35,425 35,540 35,732 36,057 36,310 38,315 43,864 43,736 46,809 38,227 45,750 C
producing 1981 47,098 46,859 46,833 41,169 48,752 53,462 54,949 56,090 54,035 51,171 49,223 48,973 50,384 52,160
regions) 1982 48,612 40,140 49,208 49,042 49,042
Wholesale 1978 25,047 25,729 25,343 25,799 26,674 26,819 - - 27,845 28,810 29,878 30,292 27,224
price 1979 30,904 33,099 34,276 34,253 35,030 35,737 37,572 40,137 40,705 40,593 39,402 38,707 36,701
Traditional (average 1980 39,593 42,311 41,840 41,461 42,524 42,965 43,695 44,472 50,907 54,734 53,036 57,147 46,224
over 16 1981 57,088 55,971 55,293 55,339 56,467 61,721 63,443 64,660 63,165 58,828 54,687 53,071 58,311
cities) 1982 52,270 54,508 54,438 57,703 64,254 65,806
Farm Gate 1978 25,041 25,376 25,217 25,505 25,978 26,017 - - 27,341 28,241 28,966 29,782 26,746
Price 1979 30,016 32,267 33,347 33,377 33,949 34,823 36,300 28,294 38,803 39,083 38,122 37,553 35,495
Rlce (average over 1980 38,311 41,040 40,446 40,299 40,962 44,746 42,603 43,383 49,276 53,018 51,678 55,398 44,847
3 producing 1981 55,442 54,294 53,529 63,625 54,559 60,042 61,818 63,471 61,660 57,409 53,247 51,456 56,713
regions) 1982 50,720 53,224 53,229 55,924 62,718 64,445
Source: Statistical Survey Section, MAP, 1982.
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Table ,13- FREE MARKET PRICES OF RICE BY VARIETY
(Unit = Won/80 Kg. of Medium Grade)
Year _HYV Traditional-Variety
Urban 1/ Gov't. Farm 2/ Gov't Urban 4/ Farm 2
Wholesale Releasing Gate Purchasing Wholesale Gate
Price Price Price Price Price. Price
1978 24,709 26,500 24,066 30,000 27,224 26,746
1979 32,671 32,000 31,912 36,600 36,701 35,495
1980 39,551 44,000 38,227 45,750 46,224 44,847
1981 52,441 44,000 50,384 52,160 58,311 56,713
Note: 1/ Average price from, 16 cities.
2/ Average price from 12 producing areas.
Source: Supplied by the Survey Section, MAF.
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off-harvest season, from June through October. The government releases the
bulk of its rice in the off harvest season. This uniform release price does
not allow the recovery of incurred storage costs, and has discouraged private
investment in storage facilities.7/
Average purchase and release prices are presented in Table 13. Note By
comparing Tables 12 and 13, that although the government release price for HYV
rice is higher than the average wholesale price, it is lower than the peak
price. Note also that it is substantially lower than the average traditional
price. The government purchase price for HYV is higher than the peak purchase
price, and in some years higher than the traditional price as well.
As the government purchase price is higher than the free market price,
and as in some years the government has not bought all of the high yield crop,
a word about the allocation mechanism of government purchase quantities is in
order. Sometime near the harvest season, the government determines its
procurement quota, based on estimated supply and demand, existing inventories,
the general price level, and the expected price of rice. Each farmer then
receives a government procurment quota, in proportion to his total quantity of
HYV rice, with some priority given to small farmers.
Table 14 gives supply and demand for aggregate rice, by source. Note
that Korea relies heavily on imports to make up for any shortfall in
production: in 1981, 33 percent of the total rice stock was imported.
Imported rice is usually Japonica rice from the United States and is really a
traditional variety. However, since it is released in delay, its quality
7/ Cf. George S. Tolley, et al., Agricultural Price Policies and the
Developing Countries, a World Bank Publication, Hohns Hopkins University
Press, 1982.
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Table 14: Overall Supply and Demand for Rice in Korea by Rice Year
(Unit : polished 1,000 M/T)
Rice Year 1978 1979 1980 1981
Classification
Supply
Inventory Carried-In 1,076 1,218 752 1,066
(Government) (953) (744) (471) (476)
(Private) (123) (534) (281) (590)
Production 6,006 5,797 5,136 3,550
Import - 501 580 2,245
Total 7,082 7,516 6,468 6,861
Demand
Foodgrains 4,986 5,099 5,057 5,091
(Farm Households) (1,846) (1,880) (1,590) (1,527)
(Non-Farm Households) (3,140) (3,219) (3,467) (3,564)
Processing 221 218 36 36
Export 80 0.0 0.0 0.0
Seeds 35 35 45 45
Loss 420 416 261 194
Others 122 996 3 0.0
Sub-total 5,864 6,764 5,402 5,366
Inventory Carried-Out 1,218 752 1,066 1,495
Total 7,082 7,516 6,468 6,861
Per Capita Consumption 134.7 135.6 132.4 131.5
(polished kg)
Source: Grain Management Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 1982.
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Table 15: Supply and Demand for Barley Polished in Rice Year 1979
(Unit : 1,000 M/T)
o Inventory o Consumption 530
Carried-In 1,104 Farm Households 361
Government 634 Non-Farm Households 169
Private 470 o Processing 93
o Seeds 55
o Current o Feedgrains 76
Production 1,508 o Loss and Others 532
Gov't Purchase 560
Private Holding 948 Sub-Total 1,286
o Total 2,612 o Carried-Out 1,326
o Gov't Release to Market 185 Government 738
Private 588
o Total 2,612
Source: Grain Management Bureau, MAF, 1982.
- 107 -
deteriorates and it is treated for the modelling purpose as indistinguishable
from HYV.
III.3 Marketing Barley
Despite the declining importance of barley as a foodgrain, it remains a
substantial contributor to the GMF deficit, in 1980 contributing nearly as
much as rice to the total deficit.
Table 15 presents supply and demand by source for barley. Some salient
features stand out: stocks of barley, both private and government, are
substantial, reaching 88 percent of current production in 1979. Also,
assuming that barley sold by the government was purchased by urban consumers,
there was virtually no private market for barley in 1979. This second point
is supported by the fact that the government release price of barley has been
constant from 1978 to 1980, yet in 1978 it was already at about half of the
procurement price.8 / Additional marketing tables for 1979 and 1980 are
presented in the Annex. Procurement procedures for barley are the same as
those for rice.
III.4 Modelling the GMF Deficit
For modelling purposes, we obtained the costs per bag incurred by the GMF
for rice and barley, which are presented in Table 16. The next to last row
presents total GMF deficits as calculated from per-bag figures; the last row
presents the official MAF budget figures.
The substantial'discrepancies between the official and the calculated
deficit may be explained as follows: i) Per bag figures are calculated on the
' Note that the change in inventory in Table 13 is not consistent:
inventory carried in + purchases - sales amounts to 1,009 thousand metric tons
(tmt), whereas inventory carried out is given as 738 tit, leaving a
discrepancy of 271 tmt.
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Table 16: Government Cost Per Unit of Grains and Deficit in the
Grain Management Operation in 1978-1980
(Unit : Won unless otherwise specified)
Rice (per bag of 80 kg) Barley (per bag of 76.5 kg)
Rice Year 1978 1979 1980 1978 1979 1980
Cost
(1) Purchase 26,200 30,000 36,834 18,500 22,000 26,400
Price
(2) Release 1/ 20,900 25,847 30,854 10,120 10,120 10,120
Price
(3) Difference 5,300 4,153 5,980 8,380 11,880 16,280
(3)-1-2
(4) Storage & 3,040 3,854 5,701 1,376 1,779 2,753
Handling Cost
(5) Deficit Per Bag 8,340 8,007 11,681 9,756 13,659 19,033
(5)-3+4
(6) Deficit Per 2/ 15,012 14,412 21,026 17,560 24,586 34,259
Seok
(7) Quantity 8,215 11,686 12,099 1,939 1,343 2,867
Released in (1,183) (1,683) (1,742) (268) (185) (396) -
1,000 Seok
(8) Total Deficit in 1,233 1,684 2,544 341 331 982
Billion Won
(8)=(6)x(7)
(9) Total Deficit 4/ 1,540 1,851 1,400 145 285 1,068
according to MAF
Fiscal Budget
Account
Note: 1/ Average prices during a given rice year.
2/ Rice: One Seok - 144 kg - 1.8 bags
Barley: One Seok - 138 kg -1.8 bags
3/ Fiscal year runs on the calendar year basis.
4/ Figures in the parentheses are in 1,000 metric tons.
Source: Grain Management Bureau, MAF, 1982
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basis of commodity flows over the rice year; whereas budget deficits follow
the fiscal year, which begins two months earlier. ii) Price differentials and
average storage costs are difficult to determine, as only a fraction of the
quantity purchased in any given year is released to the market. iii) In
fiscal accounting, additions to inventory are counted as costs, and sales from
inventory are counted as revenue. Thus when stocks are accumulating, the
deficit will be overstated. iv) The repayment of expired grain bonds and
loans is treated as an expense in the budget. Despite these discrepancies, we
model the deficit on a per bag basis (alternative i), as the most realistic
measure of incurred costs9/.
IV. The Fertilizer Market
IV.1. Historical Overview
The fertilizer sector in Korea has grown very rapidly. In 1965, domestic
production was able to meet only 19 percent of domestic agricultural demand
for fertilizer; by 1981, total fertilizer production had increased by about 16
times, to a level which was one and one-half times domestic demand (Annex
Table 12). In the same period, average per acre application of fertilizer
land tripled from 110 to 300 kg per hectare, a sudden rise occurring in the
mid-1970's when HYV rice was introduced on a large scale (Table 17).
Intensity of fertilizer use in Korea is now among the highest in the world.
9/ See also Tolley, et al., op cit.
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Table 17: Fertilizer Application
(Unit: Kg/one Ha of Cultivated Land by Crop)
Year Total Cultivated Common Naked
Land 1/ Rice Barley Barley Wheat
1965 110 345 267 330 234
1966 122 348 307 387 318
1967 136 352 301 358 315
1968 134 369 330 432 323
1969 148 363 313 404 304
1970 162 331 299 422 322
1971 183 314 297 391 322
1972 198 370 463 394 323
1973 247 345 350 414
1974 270 395 350 389 418
1975 282 460 377 508 437
1976 203 499 412 506 449
1977 243 524 410 547 383
1978 289 513 432 566 442
1979 297 486 410 521 388
1980 285 486 406 513 403
1981 300 459 396 513 401
Note: 1/ Includes double cropped area.
Source: - Agricultural Policy Handbook, MAF, 1982, p. 204
- Report on the Results of Production Cost Survey
of Agricultural Products, MAF, Various Issues.
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Table 18: Overall Demand and Supply of Fertilizer
(Unit : 1,000 Nutrient M/T)
Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1/
Item
Total Demand 2,089 2,183 1,731 1,953
Agricultural Use 866(95) 863(94) 827(95) 850(95)2/
Industrial Use 50(5) 52(6) 41(5) 42(5)
Export 504 559 341 626
Carried-Out 669 709 522 435
Total Supply 2,089 2,183 1,731 1,953
Carried-In 689 669 709 522
Import 62 58 48 none
Production 1,338 1,456 974 1,431
Note: 1/ Planned figures
2/ Number in the parentheses are relative percentage between
agricultural and industrial wage.
Source: Farm Production Bureau, MAF, 1982.
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Table 18 presents total demand and supply of fertilizer in recent
years. Domestic production and inventory carry-over far outstrip domestic
demand. Decomposing fertilizer supply and demand by element (Annex Table 13),
it is seen that nitrogen and phosphate are more than adequate to meet demand,
but that potash must still be imported on a small scale.
The currrent high intensity of fertilizer use, and the decline in barley
and HYV rice production, indicate that fertilizer demand cannot be expected to
significantly increase. The demand for fertilizer has shifted from urea and
phosphate to compound fertilizer, increasing from 38 to 66 percent of total
consumption from 1970 to 1981.
IV.2. Joint Venture Decrees and Cost Structures
In the early 1960's, the Korean government began an ambitious plan to
develop the fertilizer industry not only for domestic consumpiton, but also
for export. In consequence, nine companies have been established since the
early 60's. Of these, threel0/ were either established, or augmented as joint
ventures with American fertilizer firms. Most of the compound fertilizer is
produced by these three firms; in 1979 the three companies produced 76 percent
of total domestic consumption.
Under the joint venture decrees, the firms are guaranteed by the Korean
government a return of at least 20 percent. The government is obligated to
purchase a set quantity of fertilizer, at a price such that the contracted
level of profit is obtained. Hence, in our model, the price of fertilizer is
taken to be fixed.
This rigid price structure, and the comparative disadvantage of Korea in
0/ Yong-nam, Chinhae, and Namhae Chemical Co., Ltd.
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the production of ammonia from napth&11/, have caused domestically produced
fertilizer to be non-competitive in international markets. Export prices of
Table 19: Export Prices and Production Cost of Urea
and Compound Fertilizer (DAP) in 1979
(Unit - Won /M/T)
Fertilizer Urea DAP
Company A B C D B C
Price
Export Price (FOB) 92,150 92,150 92,150 106,700 106,700 106,700
Total Prodn Cost 113,903 159,297 143,684 147,970 170,957 149,340
Variable Cost 70,443 76,739 78,696 91,308 97,413 92,282
Fixed Cost 21,707 15,411 13,459 15,392 9,287 14,418
Government Purchasing 100,233 N.A. 140,851 140,073 145,830 137,478
Price from Industry
Government Releasing
Price to Farmers
(Before Dec. 18, 1979) 122,240 122,240 122,240 98,004 98,004 98,004
(After Dec. 18, 1979) 746,720 146,720 146,720 117,680 117,680 117,680
Source: Economic Planning Board, 1980.
11/ See Joseph Wambia "Policy Issues in Korean Agriculture" (Mimeo), World
Bank, p. 62.
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the three major companies were below production costs in 1979 (see Table
19). Korean export prices, which must be set competitvely with world prices,
have been below the government sales and purchase prices as well. The
Government must compensate the joint venture firms at a loss. The Government
price supports for fertilizer producers will continue at least up to the mid-
1980's, when the joint venture decrees expire.
V. Operations of the Fertilizer Fund (FF)
V.1. Marketing of Fertilizers
In Korea, the marketing of fertilizers for agricultural use is handled
exclusively by the National Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives (NACF),
which purchases from manufacturers and sells to farmers through its nation-
wide network.
At the end of each year, the government informs each fertilizer company
of its procurement plan, including price and quantity, and enters into a
purchase contract. At the same time the government announces the selling
price of fertilizer to farmers. Fertilizer is then acquired by the NACF, and
distributed at the government release price through its designated dealers.
As discussed above, the government purchases fertilizer from the
companies at a higher price than that at which it sells to farmers, and
exports at a still lower price. Thus, the fertilizer deficit arises from
price differences between purchases and sales, from handling and storage
costs, and from export compensation.
2. Deficit of the FF Operation 12/
Table 20 shows a detailed breakdown of the FF deficit during the period
from 1977 to 1982. By the end of 1981 the total cumulative deficit reached
12/ Like the GMF, the Fertilizer Fund operates as a special account of the
government budget.
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Table 20: Breakdown of FF Deficit
(Unit Current One Billion Won)
Year 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Item
o Deficit due to
Price Difference 13.7 1.4 -21.2 -39.2 -68.9 -43.4
Sales Revenue
by Government 144.6 170.3 166.9 195.4 290.6 344.1
Purchasing Value
from Industry 130.9 168.9 188.1 234.6 359.5 387.5
o Handling & Other
Expenses -19.1 -26.2 -34.3 -90.9 -99.8 -104.2
Transport and
Handling Cost 13.3 19.1 22.2 26.0 32.1 37.1
Interest on
Borrowing 5.8 4.8 7.8 35.4 53.6 67.1
Export Compensation
& Other None 2.3 4.2 29.5 14.1 None
o Sub-Total Deficit (A) -5.4 -24.8 -55.4 -130.1 -168.7 -147.6
o Other Revenue (B)2/ 2.9 5.1 7.1 4.4 6.4 10.1
o Total Deficit in
Current Year C-(A-B) -2.5 -19.7 -48.3 -125.7 -162.3 -137.5
o Cumulative
Total Deficit -103.5 -123.2 -171.5 -297.2 -459.5 -597.0
o Central Government
Expenditure (D) 3,251 4,505 5,975 8,110 10,6953/ N.A.
o (C/D )xlOO 0.078 0.44 0.81 1.55 1.52 N.A.
O GNP (E) 17,021 22,918 29,072 34,322 42,397 N.A.
O (C/E) x 100 0.015 0.086 0.166 0.366 0.383 N.A.
Note: 1/ Planned figures
2/ Other revenue includes basically interest receipt on FF operation
3/ Preliminary figures
Source: Agricultural Policy Handbook, MAF, p. 135, 1982.
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460 billion won, compared with a cumulative GMF deficit of 1,120 billion
won. As with the GMF deficit, the FF deficit is financed primarily by long-
term borrowing from the central bank, and is of major concern in the
management of the national money supply. In 1981 alone the FF deficit was
162.3 billion won, or 1.5 percent of central government expenditure. Note in
Table 18 that the deficit due to handling, storage, and other expenses is
greater than the deficit due to price differences. For example, in 1979,
total other expenses were 1.6 times the deficit attributable to price
differences.
In Table 21 we present a detailed version of the FF operation in 1979.
Government purchase prices by element of fertilizer are derived either as a
weighted average of prices across companies, or as the purchase price agreed
to by the company which has the largest purchase contract. To calculate the
fertilizer deficit in the model for rice year 1979 13./, we use aggregate
quantity over types of fertilizer sold, and weighted averages of purchase and
sales price.
-13/ Strictly speaking, the fertilizer deficit equation should be specified
with the portion of the fertilizer deficit applicable to rice cultivated
during 1978 plus the deficit attributable to fertilizers applied to barley
cultivated during November 1978 and May 1979. However, no data is available
with this breakdown.
Table 21: Fertilizer Fund Deficit by Element in 1979
Revenues Expenditures
Fertilizer Quantity Total Sales Sales Quantity Total Purchasing
Element Sold to Value Price Per Purchased Purchased Price per
Farmers Unit from Industry Value Unit
(Gross M/T) (Million Won) (Won/M/T) (Gross M/T) (Million Won) (Won/M/T)
Urea 548,080 66,997 122,240 670,841 94,493 140,857
Phosphate 175,471 15,079 85,934 172,700 14,558 84,296
Potash 83,187 3,499 42,062 59,00a- 4,500-1 77,586-
21-17-17 188,583 18,602 98,640 160,000 21,383 133,642
22-22-11 386,062 39,703 102,840 136,805 19,267 140,833
17-21-17 None None None 304,706 39,989 131,238
18-18-18 80,809 7,535 93,245 80,000 10,249 128,112
Others 343,078 25,468 74,234 15,160 13,061 861,544
Total 1,805,270 176,883 97,981! 1,583,052 217,500 137,3931'
Total Deficit 176,883 - 255,300 = -40,617 (million Won)
Additional Cost Item Total Additional Total Additional
Cost (Million Won) Cost per Unit (Won/M/T)
Handling & Storage 20,900 13,202
Interest 8,300 5,396
Export Compensation 4,100 2,590
Grand Total 255,300 161,271
Note: - All potash is imported.
2/ Weighted average selling price to farmers.
Weighted average purchasing price form industries ignoring additional cost items.
Weighted average purchasing price from industries plus additional cost per unit.
Source: Farm Production Bureau, MAF, 1982
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Table 1: Farm Population and Area Cultivated Per Household
Number
Total Farm of Farm Land Area Utilization
Year Population Population (B/A)xlO0 Households Per Household Rate
(a) (b) Total Paddy (X)
(persons) (persons) (in Ha) (in Ha)
1960 14,559,271 2,349,506 0.862 0.514 138.4
1965 28,705,000 15,811,575 51.7 2,506,899 0.900 0.513 147.1
1970 31,345,000 14,421,730 45.9 2,483,318 0.925 0.513 142.1
1971 32,883,000 14,711,828 44.7 2,481,525 0.915 0.510 136.5
1972 33,505,000 14,676,944 43.8 2,451,844 0.914 0.514 137.2
1973 34,103,000 14,644,566 42.9 2,450,277 0.915 0.515 136.0
1974 34,692,000 13,459,195 38.8 2,381,200 0.940 0.533 138.2
1975 35,281,000 13,244,021 38.2 2,379,058 0.941 0.536 140.4
1976 35,860,000 12,785,456 35.7 2,335,856 0.958 0.552 141.7
1977 36,436,000 12,308,834 33.8 2,303,930 0.968 0.565 135.5
1978 37,019,000 11,527,459 31.1 2,223,807 0.999 0.590 134.5
1979 37,605,000 10,883,422 28.9 2,161,821 1.021 0.606 130.9
1980 38,124,000 10,830,585 27.1 2,155,915 1.018 60.6 125.3
Note: a) Upland area equals to total area minus paddy.
b) Utilization rate is derived by total area cultivated including
doubling cropping divided by total physical size of land and
multiplied by 100.
Source: Yearbook of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics, MAF, 1981.
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Table 2: Yearly Consumption per Capita by Crop
and Farm and Non-Farm Households
Year Rice Polished Barley Polished Wheat Flour
F-H NF-H Average F-li NF H Average F-H NF-H Average
1965 116.0 126.9 120.9 67.1 30.0 50.0 N.A. N.A. N.A.
1970 123.0 147.6 136.4 58.1 19.9 37.3 9.6 2.9 13.8
1972 125.3 141.7 134.5 59.6 18.6 37.5 8.9 5.0 24.9
1975 129.4 120.1 123.6. 51.7 27.0 36.3 3.1 4.7 29.5
1976 127.4 115.7 120.1 52.5 24.6 34.7 3.6 4.8 30.2
1977 135.3 121.7 126.4 44.4 20.0 28.5 3.4 6.6 30.3
1978 145.8 129.2 134.7 32.8 10.8 18.1 3.8 6.4 30.5
1979 149.9 129.4 135.8 28.8 7.7 14.1 3.9 5.5 30.6
1980 150.7 125.5 132.4 29.1 7.9 13.8 3.7 4.9 29.4
1981 147.3 125.8 30.9 10.8 5.1 5.2
Note: F-H - Farm Households
NF-H - Non-Farm Households
Source: Report on the Results of Food Grain Consumption Survey, MAF. Rice Year 1981.
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Table 3: Supply and Demand for Government Rice in Recent Rice Years
(Unit - polished, 1000 M/T)
Rice Year 1978 1979 1980 1981
Item
Supply
Inventory carried in 953 745 471 476
Purchase 1,403 1,355 1,301 549
Imports 0.0 0.0 580 2,245
Others 0.0 0.0 31 16
Total 2,356 2,601 2,383 3,286
Demand
Market Release 1,184 1,683 1,742 1,560
Government Consumption 133 189 152 150
Processing 210 211 0.0 0.0
Loan and Others 3 47 13 81
Exports 81 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sub-total 1,601 2,130 1,907 1,791
Inventory carried out 745 471 476 1,495
Total 2,356 2,601 2,383 3,286
Source: Grain Management Bureau, MAF, 1982.
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Table 4: Government Procurement by Rice Variety
Rice Variety (in percent)
Total polished
Rice Procured Traditional H.Y.V. Rice
Rice Year (in 1000 M/T) Rice Milyang Nopung Yushin Tongil Other
1977 1,403 2.0 24.0 0.0 44.0 27.0 3.0
1978 1,301 1.6 70.0 0.9 23.9 2.8 0.8
1980 546 0.4 24.1 2.8 71.6 0.4 0.7
1981 915 11.0 35.3 0.0 51.0 0.0 2.7
Source: Grain Management Bureau, MAF, 1982.
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Table 5: Government Procurement of Rice by Grade
Total Polished 1st 2nd 3rd Off
Rice Procured Grade Grade Grade Grade
Rice Year (in 1000 M/T) (in percent)
1977 1,403 35.3 52.7 11.3 0.7
1978 1,355 14.1 41.3 29.4 15.2
1979 1,301 50.9 41.9 0.0 7.2
1980 546 45.0 47.8 0.0 7.2
1981 915 60.8 37.1 0.0 2.1
Source: Grain Management Bureau, MAF, 1982.
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Table 6: Supply and Demand for Barley Polished in Rice Year 1978
(Unit : 1,000 M/T)
Supply Demand
o Inventory o Consumption 679
Carried-in 881 Farm Households 416
Non-Farm Households 263
Government 487
Private 394 o Processing 63
o Seeds 60
o Current o Feedgrains 71
Production 1,348 o Loss and Others 252
Gov't Purchasing 484 Sub-total 1,125
Private 864
o Total 2,229 o Carried-Out 1,104
Government 634
Private 470
o Total 2,229
Source: Grain Management Bureau, MAF, 1982.
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Table 7: Supply and Demand for Barley Polished in Rice Year 1980
Supply Demand
o Inventory o Consumption 527
Carried-In 1,326 Farm Households 307
Government 738 Non-Farm Households 220
Private 588
o Current o Processing 221
Production 811 o Seeds 30
Gov't Purchase 361 o Feedgrains 104
Private 450 o Loss and Others 525
o Sub-total 1,407
o Total 2,137
o Carried-Out 730
Government 412
Private 654
o Total 2,137
Source: Grain Management Bureau, MAF, 1982
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Table 8: Flow of Rice Among Sectors in Rice Year 1978
(Unit - Polished 1,000 M/T)
Farm Households Non-Farm Households
o Supply : 6,057 o Consumption 3,361
Year-First Inventory 51 o Purchase 3,376
Current Production 6,006 1,845 Gov't channel 1,845
Free Market : 1,531
o Consumption 2,335 o Year-End Inventory 0.0
Foodgrains : 1,846 o Statistical Discrepancy 15
Seeds 35
Loss & others 454
o Sales : 3,248
1,531
To Gov't 1,403
To Free Market 1,845
o Year-End Inventory 473
Government
o Supply 2,356
Year-First Inventory 953
Purchase 1,403
1,403
o Release 1,531
o Export 80
o Year-End Inventory 744
Source: Grain Management Bureau, MAF, 1982
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Table 9: Flow of Rice Among Sectors in Rice Year 1980
(Unit - Polished 1,000 M/T)
Farm Households Non-Farm Households
o Supply : 5,416 o Consumption 3,503
1,626
Year-First Inventory : 281 o Purchase : 3,533
Current Production : 5,136 Gov't Channel : 1,907
Free Market : 1,626
o Consumption : 1,899 o Year-End Inventory : 0.0
Foodgrain : 1,590 o Statistical Discrepancy : 30
Seeds 45
Loss : 265
o Sales : 2,927
1,907
To Gov't 1,301
To Free Market : 1,626
o Year-End Inventory 590
Government
o Supply : 2,383
Year-First Inventory 471
Purchase : 1,301
Import : 580
1,301
Others : 31
o Release : 1,907
o Year-End Inventory : 476
Source: Grain Management Bureau, MAF, 1982.
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Table 10: Flow of Rice Among Sectors in Rice Year 1981
(Unit : polished 1000 M/T)
Farm Households Non-Farm Households
o Supply : 4,222 o Consumption 3,600
Year-First Inventory 590 o Purchase 3,653
Current Production 3,550 Gov't Purchase 1,709
Loan from Gov't 82 Free Market : 1,944
o Consumption 1,766 1,944
Foodgrains : 1,527 o Year- End Inventory : 0.0
Seeds : 45
Loss 194 o Statistical Descrepancy 53
o Sales : 2,493
To Gov't : 549
To Free Market : 1,944
1,709
o Year-End Inventory : -37
*82 Government
o Supply : 3,287
Year-First Inventory : 476
Purchase : 549
549
Import : 2,245
Other : 16
o Release : 1,791
o Year-End Inventory : 1,495
* Loan to farm households below poverty level
Source: Grain Management Bureau, MAF, 1982.
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Table 11: Monthly Prices of HYV and Traditional Rice in Free Market in 1978-1982
Price Year Month
JAN FEB MKR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC Average Release
Price
Wholesale 1978 23,947 24,031 23,119 22,947 23,004 24,002 25,093 25,149 25,131 25,656 26,948 27,467 24,709 26,500
Price 1979 26,667 30,358 31,213 31,624 32,675 32,818 33,463 34,219 34,227 34,425 34,398 34,959 32,671 32,000
HYV (average 1980 35,835 37,550 36,891 36,607 36,669 36,767 37,202 37,381 39,631 45,670 45,653 48,756 34,551 44,000
over 16 1981 48,937 48,885 49,032 49,422 50,833 55,593 57,447 58,357 56,644 52,993 50,848 50,296 52.444 64,000
cittes) 1982 49,938 50,354 50,400 50,400 50,400
Purchase
Price
Farm Gate 1978 23,329 23,336 22,425 22,428 22,556 23,542 24,729 24,499 24,420 24,848 25,737 26,945 24,016 30,000
Price 1979 27,061 29,428 30,384 30,802 32,664 32,367 32,775 33,280 33,438 33,500 33,337 33,910 31,912 36,600
Rice (average over 1980 34,713 36,484 35,725 35,425 35,540 35,732 36,057 36,310 38,315 43,864 43,736 46,809 38,227 45,750
producing 1981 47,098 46,859 46,833 41,169 48,752 53,462 54,949 56,090 54,035 51,171 49,223 48,973 50,384 52,160
regions) 1982 48,612 40,140 49,208 49,042 49,042
WIbolesale 1978 25,047 25,729 25,343 25,799 26,674 26,819 - - 27,845 28,810 29,878 30,292 27,224
Price 1979 30,904 33,099 34,276 34,253 35,030 35,737 37,572 40,137 40,705 40,593 39,402 38,707 36,701
Traditional (average 1980 39,593 42,311 41,840 41,461 42,524 42,965 43,695 44,472 50,907 54,734 53,036 57,147 46,224
over 16 1981 57,088 55,971 55,293 55,339 56,467 61,721 63,443 64,660 63,165 58,828 54,687 53,071 5R,311
cities) 1982 52,270 54,508 54,438 57,703 64,254 65,806
Farm Gate 1978 25,041 25,376 25,217 25,505 25,978 26,017 - - 27,341 28,241 28,966 29,782 26,746
Price 1979 30,016 32,267 33,347 33,377 33,949 34,823 36,300 28,294 38,803 39,083 38,122 37,553 35,495
Rice (average over 1980 38,311 41,040 40,446 40,299 40,962 44,746 42,603 43,383 49,276 53,018 51,678 55,398 44,847
3 producing 1981 55,442 54,294 53,529 63,625 54,559 60,042 61,818 63,471 61,660 57,409 53,247 51,456 56,713
regions) 1982 50,720 53,224 53,229 55,924 62,718 64,445
Source: Statistical Survey Section, MAF, 1982.
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Table 12: Production and Consumption of Fertilizer
Item Total Total
Production 1/ Consumption 2/ Self-Sufficiency
Year (1,000 Nutrient M/T) (1,000 NutrientTM/T) Kg/Ha Ratio (%)
1965 75 393 110 19
1967 186 479 136 39
1970 590 563 162 105
1971 599 605 183 99
1972 635 648 198 98
1973 672 793 247 85
1974 750 837 270 90
1975 860 886 282 97
1976 833 643 203 129
1977 1,089 736 243 148
1978 1,330 866 289 154
1979 1,438 863 297 167
1980 1,345 828 285 162
1981 1,168 830 300 141
Note: 1/ Including the production for industrial use
2/ Only for Agricultural use
Source: Agricultural Policy Handbook, MAF, 1982, p. 130
Table 13: Production and Consumption of Fertilizer by Element
(Unit 1,000 Nutrient M/T)
Nitrogen Phosphate Potash
Item Prodn. Cons. Self-Suf. Prodn. Cons. Self-Suf. Prodn. Cons. Self-Suf.
Ratio Ratio Ratio
Year (%) (%)
1965 75 218(55) 34 None 123(31) 0.0 None 52(14) 0.0
1967 156 271(57) 58 21 133(28) 16 9 76(15) 12
1970 400 356(63) 112 140 124(22) 112 50 83(15) 60
1971 408 347(57) 118 144 165(27) 87 47 93(15) 50
1972 418 373(58) 112 163 171(26) 95 54 104(16) 52
1973 448 411(52) 109 159 232(29) 69 65 150(19) 44
1974 514 449(54) 114 166 232(28) 72 70 156(18) 45
1975 583 481(54) 121 196 238(27) 82 82 167(19) 49
1976 534 361(56) 148 215 142(22) 151 84 140(22) 60
1977 669 388(53) 172 309 210(28) 147 111 138(19) 64
1978 788 461(53) 171 421 231(27) 182 121 174(20) 70
1979 838 444(52) 189 488 227(26) 215 112 192(22) 58
1980 727 448(54) 162 493 196(24) 251 125 184(22) 68
1981 666 432(52) 154 324 199(24) 163 178 199(24) 89
Note: 2! Production figures include agricultural plus industrial uses but consumption firgures
include agricultural use only.
21 The consumption figures are same as the amount of fertilizers sold to farmers by the
government.
3/ The numbers in the parentheses indicate relative percentage by element.
Source: Agricultural Policy Handbook, MAF, 1982, p.134.
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Table 14: Overall Demand and Supply of Fertilizer by Element
(Unit - 1,000 Gross M/T)
Year 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1/
Item
Total Supply 3,569 4,025 3,977 3,787 3,555
Production in
Current Year 2,437 2,895 3,091 2,854 2,849
Urea 906 1,067 1,186 958 1,143
DAP 1,052 1,310 1,362 1,352 1,239
Others 479 518 543 544 467
Carried-In 1,132 1,130 886 933 706
Total Demand 2,439 3,139 3,044 3,081 2,362
Domestic in
Demand 1,766 2,012 1,929 1,771 1,633
Urea 622 726 672 667 560
DAP 606 772 866 887 873
Others 538 514 391 217 200
Export 673 1,127 1,115 1,310 729
Urea 334 454 244 400 233
DAP 176 421 610 670 296
Others 163 252 211 232 200
Carried-Out 1,130 886 933 706 1,193
Note: 1 Preliminary figures
Source: Farm Production Bureau, MAF, 1982
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Table 15: Sales of Single Element Fertilizer and Complex Fertilizers
(Unit - 1,000 Nutrient M/T)
Total
Year Single Element Complex Consumption
1970 342(62) 216(38) 563
1974 517(62) 320(38) 837
1975 590(67 296(33) 886
1976 349(54) 294(46) 643
1977 347(49) 289(51) 736
1978 396(46) 470(54) 866
1979 344(40) 519(60) 863
1980 308(37) 520(63) 828
1981 280(34) 650(66) 830
Note: The numbers in the parentheses indicate relative percentage.
Source: Agricultural Policy Handbook, HAF, 1982.
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Table 16: Demand and Supply of Fertilizer for Agricultural Use
(Unit = 1,000 Nutrient M/T)
Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1/
Item
Demand 1,488 1,430 1,229 1,194
Sales 866 863 827 850
Carried-Out 622 567 402 344
Supply 1,488 1,430 1,229 1, 194
Carried-In 582 622 567 402
Import 62 58 48 None
Purchase 844 750 614 792
Note: 1/ Planned figures
Source: Farm Production Bureau, MAF, 1982.
Table 17: Fertilizer Deficit by Element in 1980
Quantity Total Sales Quantity Total Purchasing
Fertilizer Sold to Sales Price Purchased Purchased Price Per
Element Farmers Value Per Unit from Industry Value Unit
(Gross M/T) (Million Won) (Won M/T) (Gross M/T) (Million Won) (Won /M/T)
Urea 568,420 83,399 146,721 502,883 101,762 202,357
Phosphate 175,122 4,144 55,164 173,000 20,758 119,990
Potash 45,905 2,319 50,517 48,000 5,700 118,750
21-17-17 400,833 47,457 118,396 330,942 66,662 201,430
22-22-11 139,146 17,176 123,439 None None None
17-21-17 None None None 185,600 36,034 194,150
18-18-18 80,809 10,228 126,570 80,000 16,076 200,955
Others 343,078 41,502 120,970 2 10,000 32,008 3,200,800 3/ 1
Total 1,805,270 206,225 114,235 - 1,320,425 279,000 211,296 -
H
L.)
Total Deficit = 206,225 - 370,700 -164,475 (Million Won) Additional Cost
Total Additional per Unit
Additional Cost Items Cost (Million Won) (Won /M/T)
Handling & Storage 26,000 19,691
Interest 36,200 27,415
Export Compensation 29,500 22,231
Grand Total 370,700 280,743 4/
Note: 1/ All potash is imported.
2/ Weighted average selling price to farmers.
3/ Weighted average purchasing price from industries
ignoring additional cost items.
4/ Weighted average purchasing price from industries plus
additional cost per unit.
Source: Farm Production Bureau, MAF, 1982.
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Appendix B
The Formal Model
Rural Sector
Production (per household; households indexed by r 1 l to 4 indicating size of
landholding).
Profit functions:
r n ~ 3 n Wi + 3 3 nWi -W
log Trn aO + ai log -R 2 E Yijlog - log R
i=1 ~ P J=li=1 P P
n n n
3 n r wi n r
+ E $ik logKn log -R + 8k log Kn
i=1 
n
+ 2- nkk (log r2
n = H high yield variety rice
T traditional variety rice
B barley
i = L labor
F chemical fertilizer
0 other inputs
Supply functions:
37tr 3 3 3 W 3
Qr = n r( - n _ n lo -1 ogKr
n DP nR n i ci J-1 il ii pR ilaikn
n :1n1 i Q
5 r R
Market Supply -Q n (J1 Pr Qn) .HR
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Factor Demand functions:
Ws wr 3 W
an,r n (an+  yn log -R + Bn log Kr)
PR n
n
Xi D ( E Xi Pr) H
r-l n=r
Income
3 r R
Full income = Y WL . r T+ E nr P +0
n-r
Demand
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log P = a0 + E an log n + E gnm log Pm log Pn
n-i1n nl miL
R 4 r R
Dn r( E Dn Pr) H
m,n index goods H, T, B as in production plus:
OG - other goods and Le - leisure
Urban Sector
Income (households indexed by u-i to 4 for class membership)
Full Income - Y EnwU .E . T + 0
u L u u
Demand
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log P = a + E a log P + E E g log P log P
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Market Clearing Conditions
Paddy land allocation (for each class r):
R r H I - H H rP * *r ( Tr log -p ++f+i lo KT)H H iK R k ',lo H
r
T T 1K TT 
Kr
KT
K + KT = K (total paddy land)
High Yield Rice market
R Z
QH =H + DH - M + AH
Traditional Rice Market:
QT = DR + DZ + ATT T T+A
Barley Market:
R Z
Q1 DB + B +IB +AR
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Rural Labor Market:
I. W = W (fixed wages)
II. YL (H T rR O Pr Er) - DLe
III. V(Y* P p R V(Yr,P ) for r=O, u=1
Government Deficits
Ga (PR _ P + h (DH -M) + (P* - P . M
B (PB PB + hB) (D + IB)
GF (PF WF + hF) (XF + xF) + (PF + hF) I
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Variables (classified by first appearance in model)
Rural Sector
Production
r Profit from crop n for a family in class r
n (in units of output)
Wi Price of factor i in rural area
nR Price of commodity n in rural area
n
Kr Land used in crop n by family in class r
n
Production of crop n by family in class r
Q Total Production of crop n
Pr Fraction of rural households in class r
HR Total number of rural households
xn,r Demand for factor i by family in class r for
use in crop n
Xi Total demand for factor i in rice and barley
production
Income
Yr Full income of family in class r
Er Number of working members of family
T Total endowment of time (8760 hrs./year)
9r Other income received by family in class r
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Demandr
Dn Demand for good n by family in class r
N Number of family members in class r
r
pR Rural Price Index
DR Total rural demand for good n
n
Urban Sector
Income
Y Full income of family in class u
u
Wage rate faced by family in class u
E Number of working family members in class u
B Other income of family in class u
Demand
Du Demand for good n by family in class u
n
N Number of family members in class u
PZ Urban Price Index
Dn Total Urban Demand for good n
n
HZ Number of Urban Households
PU Fraction of Urban Households in class u
Market Clearing
Conditions
M Rice Imports
An Waste and feedgrain use of good n
IB Inventory accumulation of Barley
V(.,.) Indirect utility function
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WPH Price of rice imports
H
hn Handling cost per unit of n
P0 Purchase price of fertilizer
F
IF Inventory accumulation of fertilizer
XF Use of fertilizer for purposes other than rice
and barley cultivation
G Deficit from commodity fund s
s
Endogenous Variables in Market Clearing Equations
TrrH iTrrr , Kr, DRH, DZ QH' DTR DT, QT' B, DBR QB' XL\ R
WL (labor markets II and III)
Exogenous Variables in Market Clearing Equations
Kr, AHp AT, AB, HR, WL (labor market I)
Policy Instruments
PH, PH, PRB B, WF, M
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Production
The production structure for all three crops (high yield and traditional
rice, barley) is assumed to be characterized by a translog restricted profit
function.
This form provides a quite general characterization of production when
data is sufficient for complete econometric estimation. In addition, the
flexibility of this functional form allows a priori information to be included
conveniently when data is not available. For example, if the demand for
fertilizer is known to be inelastic, this fact can be incorporated by
increasing the parameter yff (f referring to fertilizer) arbitrarily. In
the Cobb-Douglas case, this possibility is not allowed at all. In the CES
case, the assumption of inelastic fertilizer demand implies inelastic demand
for all factors and incorporates quite strong assumptions about cross
elasticities.
This functional form also lends itself to the analysis of two issues of
particular interest in this project: farmer income generation and crop
substitution. The rent accruing to the farmer is directly given by !Tn when
Kr units of land are owned. Total rent from land ownership, then, is E nr
n n
n
which can be added to wage and other income. This is the point at which the
current study incorporates the insights of farm household models.
As for crop substitution, the assumption made is that for the period
under analysis (a crop season) land is fixed to the farm but variable between
uses. The only substitution which is explicitly modelled is between high
yield and traditional rice. Both are included in the analysis, have the same
growing season and use similar land. Barley is not a plausible substitute on
the production side for rice (different growing season) and since the
alternative uses of barley land are not explicitly modelled, an ordinary
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barley supply function is adequate.
Land is assumed to be allocated between high yield and traditional rice
use such that the value of the marginal product of land is equal across uses.
Since separate information on the production functions of the two rices
is not available, the production functions will differ only by the shift
parameter to a in the first pass of the simulations.
The above equilibrium condition, identical production functions and
constant returns to scales imply a linear production possibility frontier
between the two crops. The producer price ratio will be fixed in this case
and equilibrium in the full model will require that traditional rice prices
(left endogenous) will move in proportion to the subsidized price of high
yield (See Figure 1).
HYV W Consumer price
Producer price
Traditional
Figure 1: Production Possibility Frontier For Rice
Perfect substitutability between goods on the production side implies bang-
bang behaviour for a typical farmer but not for the market as a whole (unless
they are perfect substitute in demand or the indiffenence curves hit the
axis). The strong implications of this linearity can be weakened by either
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changing the BiK terms between the two rices (changing the use of variable
inputs alone does not affect the linearity) or by assuming decreasing returns
to scale.
Consumption
The functional form for the system of demand equation to be used is the
Almost Ideal Demand System of Deaton and Muellbauer. The form for a typical
demand equation is:
P1 i - ai + Bi log (P N) + y lot g J
Pi - Price of good i
Ci Quantity purchased of good i
Y - Income of family
P exp [a + E ai log Pi + Yi (log Pi) (log P)
N - # of household members
As written, this is also the estimating equation for econometric work.
This form has a variety of advantages for analyzing agricultural product
demand in less developed countries. First, in contrast to other common
functional forms for demand analysis such as the linear expenditure system
(LES) the AIDS system is quite flexible with regard to price and income
elasticities. Of particular interest in a disaggregated model including basic
grains is the possibility of inferior commodities or commodities which are
normal for low income consumers and become inferior at higher income levels.
This possibility is ruled out by the LES system but wil generally occur in the
AIDS case when B < 0 though not necessarily in the relevant range of
incomes. This pattern of food use is frequently observed in disaggregate
models. In the Korea context, barley is generally considered to be an
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inferior good. Similarly, casual investigation of consumption of high yield
rice suggests an inverted U shaped Engel curve.
Second, except for the price index generating real income, the AIDS
system is linear in the parameters and therefore can be estimated with
ordinary least squares (if symmetry is not imposed on the matrix of Yjj )j
The price index can be replaced by a simple Stone, expenditure share-weighted
price index and estimated directly. This is a significant advantage if non-
research oriented people are expected to carry out this analysis is the field.
Third, this demand formulation generally responds well in contexts where
data is deficient. To improve the estimates in the face of data of
questionable quality, instrumental variable estimation techniques will be
used. Since the equation is linear and of simple form, this extra
complication is easy to introduce.
Two different versions of the model can be run for a short-run analysis
where migration between the two sectors is ruled out. In one, the rural wage
is fixed exogenously. In this case, no explicit supply curve for labor need
be computed from data. In the second case, a fully endogenous wage rate is
generated by demand curves derived from the production structure above and
supply curves derived from the consumer choice problem. To incorporate labor
supply decisions into the analysis, the income term in the demand system
should be the "full income" concept (after Becker). Explicitly, the per
capita income of a farm household of type i can be written:
Y W x Ei x T + Ti + Hi + Bi +Qi
N NiNi it
where Ei is the number of members in the labor force, T is the total
endowment of time, Ri are profits from crop R, Qi is other income and Ni is
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the number of family members. Farms are distinguished in this study by amount
of land owned (landless; less than .5 to 1 ha, 1 to 1.5 ha, 1.5 to 2 ha, more
than 2 ha).
With this definition of full income, the value of leisure (wage rate x
leisure time) can be used in the demand structure above and leisure demand
estimated. In the calculation of the impact of policy changes on incomes,
both the impact on full income and on disposable or money income (full income
minus the imputed value of leisure) can be computed. The latter may be more
easily understood by policy makers and will involve more reasonable-looking
numbers.
In the long-run model involving migration, the simple versions explored
here will set the utility levels (consistent with the AIDS system) of the
poorest groups in both sectors equal as an equilibrium condition. The
equilibrium condition in this version is:
V(Yu, PZ) V(Y , P ) u=1, r=O
where V(Y, P) = log (a)/(Bo n Pn
Y = income of group
an = Income term in the AIDS System
P = Price index as calculated in the AIDS system.
Model Calibration
Given the structure of the model, the next task is to choose parameter
values which will fit available information concerning the Korean economy for
a base year. In this case the year chosen is 1979.
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A great deal of information is known which is relevant to the model at
hand. Unfortunately, since such information comes from many disparate
sources, not all of it is completely internally consistent. The main reason
for inconsistencies are the different types of data available (e.g. sample
survey vs. aggregate figures), different years in which such information is
available and, perhaps most importantly, the fact that the model is not a
perfect and exact representation of the underlying reality. Since the true
production function is not exactly a translog production function (the claim
made is merely that the latter is a close approximation to the former) we
cannot expect this function, regardless of the parameters chosen, to exactly
reproduce observed values. The purpose of the calibration exercise,
therefore, is to combine all of these various bits of information into a
consistent framework.
The main types of information to be incorporated are: 1) Aggregate MAF
and national account statistics, such as total area and production of crops or
urban per capita incomes 2) Information from the Farm Household Economy
Surveys which are reported in group average (e.g. by farm size) but which are
not analyzable at the household level. Average farm income and land ownership
patterns are derived from this c) Survey data in original form which is
suitable for formal econometric estimation. This source of data may be rare
in many countries but in Korea, the rural household survey of 1970 was
available. A detailed description of the estimation procedure used is
presented in the following section. d) A priori judgement concerning key
behavioral patterns such as demand or supply elasticities or substitution
possibilities between goods (in demand) or land (in supply). Since so much
information from other sources was appropriate, little reliance was necessary
on these external judgement. In countries where data is scarce, such
judgements will be more important, e) Goverment records on actual prices
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charged or quantities transacted in official channels.
The calibration tries to stay as close to the above information as
possible without violating the requirements of the model. These requirements
are of two forms. The first is simply that all equations of the model hold.
All market clearing equations must be satisfied and all production and demand
equations must be satisfied for the levels of income, prices, land area etc.
used in the model.
The second type of restriction on the values of parameters and variables
result from requirements of the functional forms chosen and common sense.
While the translog production function and the AIDS demand system are flexible
characterization of behavior, they have one important drawback. For a given
set of parameter values, they are not guaranteed to be "well behaved" for any
arbitrary set of prices (or incomes in the AIDS case). Thus, while they are
good "local" approximation to the underlying function they need not satisfy
the requirements of demand or production theory globally. In particular, if
estimated from survey data, the demand system may violate requirements of
theory for the data in the base year used for calibration. The second set of
requirements, then are those which assure that the demand and supply systems
conform to the basic requirements of theory in the base year. These are 1)
Non negatively of quantities. More from common sense than from theory,
implied levels of production and consumption must be positive 2) Convexity
requirements from theory. The implicit cost function for the translog
production structure must be concave in factor prices and the expenditure
function of the AIDS system must be concave in commodity prices.
Given the goal of matching base year numbers with a well behaved set of
demand and supply relations, the approach takes is related to Bayesian
decision theory and takes the form of solving the following optimization
problem:
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Minimize Ea±((Xi - )/-)
with respect to
Xis
wi
subject to 1) all model equations are satisfied
2) all theoretical restrictions on
parameters are satisfied
3) all values known with certainty are set
The Xis can be parameter values of the demand or supply system,
functions of those parameters (such as price or income elasticities for a
particular income group) or quantities in the base period which are not known
with complete certainty (such as prices in uncontrolled markets or the
relative proportion of paddy land in high yield variety versus traditional
rice).
The Xis are the values the Xis are expected to take given the various
sorts of information discussed above. We would like the final result to be as
close to these independently observed values and proportional deviations from
these values are penalized. The Xis may be actual, econometricaly determined
parameters such as the y's in the supply or demand system, they may be
elasticities of demand or supply from either these estimates or from prior
beliefs or they may be values of quantities or prices from questionable
sources (such as, for example, a rudimentary survey of prices designed to get
only approximate estimates).
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The ai's are weights which reflect the degree of confidence we have in
these starting values, the Xs's . If, for example, we are quite sure of the
price elasticity of barley for the average rural consumer but not so sure of
the relative consumption of HYV rice to traditional, the former term would
have a larger value of ai than the latter.
The restriction to ensure a well behaved system in the base period are
a) all quantities are positive b) all marginal products of factors of
production are positive c) the Slutsky matrix [Sii] of the demand system has
negative diagonal elements, that is
0 > s a2~ log Y PQ ..L,) ) Y/P 2> ii =(Yii + Si  p _ 1 i l ii) 
for all commodities i and all income groups in the base period. This is a
necessary, but not sufficient condition for a well behaved demand system. The
sufficient condition (that the Slutsky matrix be negative semidefinite) was
too difficult to impose directly but was checked after the calibration run.
To illustrate how this method works, a simple example is presented in the
following diagram
B
Ep R(yE )/
B ~ ~ R -
-. 38 y ,p
.5 R
Ty
Calibration Technique Example
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In this case, two parameters of interest are separated from the rest of
the model for graphical convenience, the price elasticity of barley for the
average rural income group (ep) and the income elasticity fo rice for, say,
the richest rural group (e ) . The curve g(ep,e,R) represents they pC
combination of these values which will satisfy the remainder the model, given
quantities consumed, incomes, prices, the AIDS functional form, etc. For the
model to work, we must choose a point on this curve for our parameter values.
The point A represents the values of these parameters we would most like
to have for our base period. They might have come from econometric estimate
which yielded a price elasticites of -.38 for barley and an income elasticity
of .5 for rice. Since these values are not consistent with the rest of the
model (not being on the function g (.,.)), another point which is on this
functiom must be chosen. The points on the concentric ellipses are
equidistant from the point A, given a set of weights ai. If the weights are
equal, the ellipses will be circles. The parameters which generate the
elasticities at point B would be the one which this method would choose for
the model. These values would satisfy all the requirements of the model
(being on the function g (.,.)) and requiring the smallest degree of
modification to the values which are known from independent sources (being the
"closest" point to our reference A).
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APPENDIX C
Parameter Estimation
Parameters in the consumption and production relations in the model were
calculated by two different methods. The MAF regularly collects survey data
from rural areas. This data was sufficient to formally estimate production
functions and a system of demand function with econometric methods. The
estimation procedure and results are outlined in this section. The other
method, which requires much less information, is briefly discussed and
contrasted with the more complete procedures.
Production
The estimating equations for the translog restricted profit function are
the factor demand equation written in share form. Two issues come up in the
context of the estimation. The first is the restrictions which can be imposed
on the parameter values to incorporate assumptions or requirements of
production theory. The second is problems arising from the use of survey
data.
From production theory, the matrix of substitution term should be
symmetric, i.e., the coefficient of the wage term in the fertilizer equation
should be the same as the fertilizer coefficient in the labor demand
equation. This restriction requires iterative estimation techniques rather
than ordinary least squares. The second restriction (more a matter of choice
than a requirement of theory) is that the production process for grains be
subject to contstant returns to scale. If all inputs, including land, were
doubled then output would double as well.
The only product for which complete price and output information was
available was the aggregate commodity rice. Separate information was not
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available for HYV and traditional rice. The inputs used for estimation
purposes were: labor, organic fertilizer, inorganic fertilizer, animal
inputs, pesticides and others. As described in Appendix B only the inorganic
fertilizer and labor terms are used in the simulation. The remaining inputs
are used to get consistent estimation of the paramaters of interest.
Survey data relies on the recollection of the farmer concerning
quantities of the various factors used and the expenditure on them. Since
both of these quantities are subject to error and since the independent
variables (prices) are derived by dividing expenditures by quantities, the
measurement of these variables are necessarily subject to error. This could
introduce bias in the estimates. To correct for this, instrumental variables
are used in the estimation. With constant returns to scale and symmetry of
prodtuction parameters imposed and instrtmental variable techniques, the
following equations were estimated:
WL . XL .332 +.174 WL .018 WF
-- (.026) + (100) log p+ (.021) log.p
R R
033log W0 .150 WA .017 wp
+ 005) log (.063) log PR + (.017) lgR
wF * F .072 .018 WL + .021 log P
it = (.005) (.021) g PR .011 R
w0 ~~WA W P
+ .011 log p- - .017 log p + .005 log p-
(.010) R (.013) R (.003) R
standard errors in parentheses.
Wi . Price of factor i
Xi 3 Quantity used of factor i
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i = L: Labor
= F: Chemical fertilizer
= 0: Organic fertilizer
- A: Animal inputs
= P: Pesticides
w = Profit in rice
The only parameters left to be chosen are the average profit terms, the
a 's of the profit function. These were chosen for HYV and traditional rice
in order to match actual profitability figures for 1979. This is the only way
in which the two strains differ.
Statistical tests reject the hypothesis that the independent variables
are free of measurement error -/ justifying the use of instrumental variable
estimation. Statistical tests also reject the hypothesis that the production
structure is Cobb-Douglas. This would require that all coefficients on prices
are zero. The essential difference is that the estimated production function
exhibits somewhat smaller elasticities of substitution between inorganic
fertilizer and labor than the Cobb-Douglas form would allow. It also implies
less elastic factor demands. However, in the simulation model the estimated
production structure had little effect on the results. Assuming a Cobb-
Douglas form makes the choice of parameters much easier. In this case,
average shares of output spent on each input is sufficient. This information
needn't come from survey data, regional even national level data is adequate.
The supply elasticity implied by the above estimates is between .37 and
.52 for the translog and Cobb-Douglas versions. This cross-section, survey-
based assessment was validated by an aggregate, time series estimation of a
1/ See J. Hausman "Specification Tests in Econometrics."
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"Nerlove" type 2/ using MAF annual statistics. In this simple estimation, the
supply elasticity with respect to price was found to be .42. This is within
the range used in the simulation and provides independent confirmation of the
parameter values used.
Demand
Demand equations are subject to essentially the same problems as
supply. The issues of symmetry and errors in variables are identical and
treated in the same way. The only extra constraint imposed on the estimation
is that the labor supply is fixed. This requires that "leisure's" share of
full income is independent of the prices of all goods. The resulting
equations for rice and barley are:
PRqR Y + .1 o 
- 3 .307 - .033 log p + .017 log PR -.0002 log PB
(.012) (.001) (.005) (.0002)
_ .001 log P0
(.002)
-B = .126 - .013 log PN - .0002 log PR + .006 log PB
(.005) (.005) (.0002) (.002)
+ .001 log P
(.0007) °
Standard errors in parentheses
PRI PB, P0 - Price of rice, barley, other foods
QR' QB - Quantity consumed of rice, barley
Y - Price index (cost of living)
N - Family size
2/ See Cumming and Askari, Agricultural Supply Response: A Survey of the
Econometric Evidence, (New York, Praeger, 1976).
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As with the production parameters, the above estimates imply that demand for
rice and barley are less elastic than unity. At the mean of the sample, the
price elasticity for rice is .63 and for barley .38.
The income effects (both negative) imply that consumption declines as a
share of income as income rises. In fact, both rice and barley become
inferior goods at the high end of the sample income distribution. The Engel
curves for these commodities have the following shape (see figure 2), commonly
tound for foodstuffs:
Consump tion
Income
Figure 2 Engel Curve for a Typical Food Product
Again, as with the production estimates, the test of errors in variables
implies that measured error is a problem and justified the use of the more
complicated instrumental variable techniques. In contrast with the production
case, however, the difference between the estimated version of the demand
system and its Cobb-Douglas simplification (all own price elasticities equal
to 1) was substantial when included in the simulation model. The simplified
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parameter values entailed setting all price effects in the above relation
equal to zero. Aggregate consistency was achieved by choice of the income
terms. With a known income distribution and known consumption patterns for
urban and rural consumers, values for the mean share and the income term may
be identified.
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